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IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY OF CRIMINAL TRIALS 
THROUGHLEGALRULESTHATENCOURAGE 
DEFENDANTS TO TESTIFY 
Jeffrey Bellin" 
Reflecting a traditional bias against defendants' trial testimony, the 
modern American criminal justice system, which now recognizes a 
constitutional right to testify at trial, unabashedly encourages 
defendants to waive that right and remain silent. As a result, a large 
percentage of criminal defendants decline to testify, forcing juries to 
decide the question of the defendant's guilt without ever hearing from 
the person most knowledgeable on the subject. 
This Article contends that the inflated percentage of silent defendants 
in the American criminal trial system is a needless, self-inflected wound, 
neither required by the Constitution nor beneficial to the search for 
truth. Consequently, the Article proposes two alternative reforms 
designed to eliminate, or at least minimize, the legal inducements to 
remaining silent at trial. The reforms, if adopted, would encourage a 
greater number of defendants to testify (and be cross-examined), 
funneling more factual information into the crucible of the adversary 
process, and thereby increasing the reliability of trial outcomes. 
* Senior Appellate Attorney, California Courts of Appeal; former Assistant United States 
Attorney; J.D., Stanford Law School, 1999. Readers may contact the author at 
Jeffrey.Bellin@gmail.com 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the exact numbers vary by jurisdiction, studies reveal that 
up to half of all criminal defendants who proceed to trial elect not to 
testify on their own behalf, and that this percentage has been increasing 
since at least the early twentieth century. 1 One reason defendants 
decline to testify is that over the past two centuries, the courts have 
constructed an elaborate jurisprudence vigorously protecting the right 
I. Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the innocent: A Close Look at a New 
Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REv. 925, 950-51 (2002) (summarizing studies dating back to 
the 1920s and concluding that "with increasing frequency defendants are not taking the stand at trial as 
they once did" and "the extent of refusals to testify varies from one-third to well over one-half [of 
defendants] in some jurisdictions"); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 311, 329-30 (1991) (describing study of trials in Philadelphia in 
the 1980s that revealed that 49% of felony defendants and 57% of misdemeanor defendants chose not to 
testify); Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1449, 1450, 1459 (2005) (noting that "only half' of the defendants who proceed to trial testify on their 
own behalf). 
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not to testify, and an equally elaborate jurisprudence permitting 
numerous burdens to be placed on the right to testify. This case law has 
no unifying legal principle, but a common practical effect-encouraging 
defendants to remain silent at trial. 
As there are numerous reasons why the criminal justice system should 
seek to encourage defendants to testify and no clear reasons to 
encourage them to remain silent, this Article proposes two alternative 
reforms designed to induce defendants to "cast aside [their] cloak of 
silence"2 and exercise their constitutional right to testify. By 
encouraging more defendants to testify (and be cross-examined), the 
reforms would not necessarily benefit defendants or prosecutors, but can 
be expected to improve the reliability of trial outcomes by maximizing 
the factual information available to the jurors who must decide a 
defendant's fate? 
Part I of the Article illustrates the desirability of the goal of the 
proposed reforms, summarizing the various benefits that would accrue to 
the criminal justice system and society generally if more defendants 
were to testify. Part II sketches the constitutional bounds within which 
the reforms must operate, providing a background discussion of the 
history of the constitutional right to testify and the right not to testify-a 
history that continues to resonate through the modem patchwork of legal 
rules surrounding those rights. Part III then illustrates the modern 
parameters of these countervailing rights, detailing the legal rules that 
have brought about the defendant-silencing status quo by severely 
penalizing defendants who exercise the right to testify (e.g., by 
permitting impeachment with prior convictions) and significantly 
rewarding those who remain silent (e.g., by prohibiting adverse 
prosecutorial comment on a defendant's trial silence). Part IV presents 
two alternative reform proposals designed to alter the status quo. 
The first proposal, the more obvious and direct approach to 
encouraging a greater percentage of defendants to testify, would 
eliminate many of the existing incentives to silence and disincentives to 
testifying through a discrete set of changes to the rules governing 
2. This colorful image appears in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980), which 
excused the prejudicial impeachment of a testifying defendant on the ground that it "follows the 
defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence." /d.; see also Raffel v. United States, 271 
U.S. 494, 497 (1926) ("[H]aving once cast aside the cloak of immunity, [a defendant] may not resume it 
at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing."). 
3. See Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self 
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857,864,922 (1995) (arguing in a related context that "one can 
simultaneously reduce both false negatives and false positives only by bringing more information into a 
system" and that "[ o ]ur current system throws out too much information, and in the end, this hurts both 
truth-seeking prosecutors and innocent defendants"). 
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criminal trials. As the legal rules that would be affected by this change 
currently serve little purpose other than to discourage testimony, the 
reform engenders few negative collateral consequences. The second, 
more modest, proposal seeks to increase the percentage of testifying 
defendants within the existing criminal procedure framework through 
the early identification and potential resolution of obstacles to a 
defendant's testimony in a new, formally structured in limine procedure. 
Both proposals seek to accomplish the goal of maximizing the 
percentage of defendants who testify-and thus the facts available to the 
jury-within constitutional parameters, while at the same time 
minimizing any alteration of the current balance of power between the 
prosecution and the defense. 
I. THE VALUE OF HEARING FROM THE DEFENDANT AT TRIAL 
It is difficult to perceive any legitimate criminal justice or societal 
interest that is served when a defendant declines to testify at trial. There 
are, however, decided disadvantages for both the criminal justice system 
and society in general when the right to remain silent is invoked. 
First and foremost among the disadvantages is that the reliability of 
the trial process suffers. When the defendant, "who above all others 
may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case,"4 is silent, the jury 
is deprived of critical factual information. This deprivation increases the 
danger of a verdict based on "a partial ... presentation of the facts"5 and 
at the same time impairs the related "public interest in a full and truthful 
disclosure of critical facts."6 Indeed, the Supreme Court, which bears 
4. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961) ("[D]ecades ago the considered consensus of 
the English-speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn 
testimony of the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case."); 
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 306 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The one person who usually 
knows most about the critical facts is the accused."); Renee Lett ow Lerner, The Intersection of Two 
Systems: An American on Tria/for an American Murder in the French Cour v·Assises, 2001 U.lLL. L. 
REv. 791, 824-25 ("The defendant always knows information important to the fact-finder-if nothing 
else, where he was at the time the crime was committed."); Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in 
Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2636 (1996) ("The virtues 
of an 'accusatorial' system in which defendants are privileged to remain passive are far from obvious. 
The person who knows the most about the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant is ordinarily the 
defendant herself. Unless expecting her to respond to inquiry is immoral or inhuman ... renouncing all 
claim to her evidence is costly and foolish."); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1047, 1055 (1994) ("[The) aspiration to 
capture the defendant as a testimonial resource is perfectly understandable. He is, after all, the most 
efficient possible witness."). 
5. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). 
6. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412 (1988); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 
(1950) ("'For more than three centuries it has ... been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the 
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primary responsibility for the silencing of defendants, has itself 
recognized the imperative for defendant testimony, explaining: 
[T]he conviction of our time [is] that the truth is more likely to be arrived 
at by hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding 
who may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leavin.p 
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury .... 
As the Court has emphasized in other contexts, "[t]he need to develop 
all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and 
comprehensive," and "[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and 
public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the 
facts."8 
The decreased reliability of trial outcomes due to a partial 
presentation of facts is felt most severely in cases where an innocent, or 
partially innocent,9 defendant declines to testify. In such circumstances, 
the jury is deprived of testimony of incomparable value-truthful 
testimony from the witness most knowledgeable about the events in 
question-that could prevent unjust punishment by the state, and 
potentially an escape from justice by the guilty party. 10 The conviction 
of innocent defendants is particularly noxious because it not only 
offends any common conception of justice, but also undermines the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system causing irreparable damage to 
society as a whole. 11 
The loss of critical factual information when the defendant remains 
public ... has a right to every man's evidence."' (quoting JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2192 (3d ed. 
1940))); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 ("(E]xceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly 
created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."). 
7. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967)); id. at 52 ("In fact, the most important witness for the defense in many 
criminal cases is the defendant himself. There is no justification today for a rule that denies an accused 
the opportunity to offer his own testimony."). 
8. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709, 711 (asserting that the interest in the presentation of all relevant 
information at trial "has constitutional dimensions" rooted in the Sixth Amendment and "[i]t is the 
manifest duty of the courts to vindicate [these constitutional] guarantees"); cf Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408 
("Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."). 
9. Examples of a "partially innocent" defendant include a defendant who is innocent of some 
counts but not others (e.g., possessing, but not selling cocaine), or who is innocent of a greater, but not a 
lesser, offense (e.g., a defendant who is guilty of manslaughter instead of murder). 
10. See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian {!?] Analysis 
and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637,666 (1991) ("(S]ome of the defendants who decline 
to take the stand because of the prospect of character impeachment are not in fact guilty" and in a subset 
of those cases "that failure to take the stand is utterly disastrous, spelling the difference between 
conviction and acquittal."). 
II. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975) ("The dual aim of our criminal justice 
system is 'that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."' (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 88 ( 1935))). 
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silent at trial is also felt when the testimony that is foregone is the false 
testimony of a guilty defendant. This is because even false testimony, 
when recognized as such, provides valuable insights. 
A premise of the American jury system is that false testimony will be 
exposed when subjected to the "crucible" of the adversary process. 12 
This premise is particularly forceful in the case of a defendant's 
testimony, which will be tested by cross-examination and the 
presentation of rebuttal evidence by a prosecutor possessing 
investigatory resources limited only by the prosecuting agency's 
estimation of the significance of the case. It is to be expected, then, that 
in the vast run of cases, a defendant's false testimony will be exposed or 
at least significantly undermined and, as a consequence, the search for 
truth will not be obscured by a lying defendant's perjury, but rather 
enlightened by the defendant's unintentional disclosure of a 
consciousness of guilt. 13 
In the case of both the innocent and guilty defendant, the defendant's 
testimony also invariably helps to focus the trier of fact on the key issues 
in dispute. Without the testimony of the defendant, the defense strategy 
generally devolves into an effort to discredit any and all aspects of the 
prosecution's case, asserting generically that the prosecution has not 
12. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983) ("[T]he truthfinding process is better served if 
the witness' testimony is submitted to 'the crucible of the judicial process so that the factfinder may 
consider it, after cross-examination, together with the other evidence in the case to determine where the 
truth lies."' (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 440 (1976) (White, J. concurring in 
judgment))); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (stating that the Constitution "commands, 
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the 
crucible of cross-examination"); Great Coastal Exp., Inc. v. lnt'l Broth. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 
1357 (4th Cir. 1982) ("Peijury and fabricated evidence are evils that can and should be exposed at trial, 
and the legal system encourages and expects litigants to root them out as early as possible."); cf 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (describing cross-examination as the '"greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"' (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367)). 
13. See Miijan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal 
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 528 (1973) (explaining that continental 
European systems encourage defendant testimony even though it is often false, because "[i]t is believed 
that precious information can be obtained even from false denials of guilt, detected inconsistencies, and 
other verbal or non-verbal expressions emanating from the defendant's person"); Lerner, supra note 4, at 
827 ("A defendant need not be truthful to reveal a great deal, as all detectives know."); Amar & Lettow, 
supra note 3, at 864, 903 (recognizing value of a lying witness in related context because the witness 
"may well sound unconvincing or trip himself up with inconsistent testimony," and will "be subject to 
impeachment via cross-examination and ... introduction of other evidence and witnesses" leaving "[t]he 
jury ... perfectly poised to assess witness credibility and to resolve factual disputes" which, "of course, 
is what we pay jurors to do"); Langbein, supra note 4, at I 053 (recounting view of 18th century 
commentator, Seijeant William Hawkins, on the virtue of defendant's testimony that even '"[i]f the 
defendant is guilty"' the testimony '"may often help to disclose the Truth, which probably would not so 
well be discovered from the artificial Defense of others speaking for them"'); id. (recounting response to 
Hawkins that '"Hawkins' message is that it is desirable for the accused to speak, either to clear himself 
or to hang himself"). 
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carried its burden of proof. Both the prosecution's presentation and the 
jury's deliberations then must presume every material fact to be in 
dispute, hindering the jury's ability to focus its deliberative energy on 
the critical issues in the case. When a defendant testifies, however, 
certain factual aspects of the case will likely be conceded so that the 
defendant can construct a logical narrative of his actions. This will 
allow the jury to focus on the actual areas of factual dispute between the 
prosecution's and the defendant's narratives. In such a circumstance, 
even if the defendant lies about some material facts--e.g., "I was there, 
but did not pull the trigger"-the jury has received valuable information 
--e.g., "I was there"-and can focus its deliberations accordingly, 
improving the likelihood of a reliable outcome. 14 
In addition to increasing the reliability of trial outcomes, maximizing 
the percentage of defendants who testify would also strengthen the 
perception of fairness, and thus perceived legitimacy, of the criminal 
justice system. A system in which a large percentage of criminal 
defendants are charged, tried, and either convicted or acquitted-a series 
of events that for many defendants will be defining moments in their 
lives-without ever speaking on their own behalf has been aptly 
described as a "massive democratic and human failure." 15 Whatever one 
thinks about the value of a criminal defendant's speech in particular 
cases, it cannot be denied that viewed from a defendant's perspective, a 
system that accuses, judges, and, in some cases, even punishes without 
ever hearing from the accused appears unfair and dictatoria1. 16 The fine 
distinction that the defendant may have technically had an opportunity to 
testify is likely of little comfort in the confines of a prison cell. In no 
other context, from the termination of an employee to the informal 
punishment of misbehaving children, would it be considered just to mete 
out punishment without hearing from the accused. 17 In the American 
14. For example, in a murder prosecution the prosecution may attempt to establish that (i) the 
defendant knew the victim; (ii) wanted him dead; (iii) owned a gun; (iv) was present at the time of the 
murder; (v) shot the victim; and (vi) did so without legal justification. If the defense is simply that the 
prosecution has not met its burden, the jury must puzzle over each of these factual questions, and its 
diffuse focus may result in a mistaken outcome. If the defendant testifies, however, he will likely 
concede some of the points, for example that he knew the victim and was with him when he died, and 
contend only that another person pulled the trigger; the jury may accept those concessions and refocus 
its energies accordingly. 
15. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1449. Of course an even larger percentage of defendants waive 
their right to testify by pleading guilty. 
16. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1450 (recognizing that "some defendants do not even speak at their 
own sentencings"); cf Lerner, supra note 4, at 825 (stating that active participation in French criminal 
trials often aids defendants because "even if the defendant does not outright confess, describing his 
thoughts or actions might in some cases make him appear more sympathetic or at least understandable"). 
17. /d. at 825 ("In everyday life, our methods of finding out the truth normally include talking 
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criminal justice system, this fairly common occurrence of rendering 
judgment without an account from the accused is countenanced and even 
celebrated as "a victory for defendants."18 
There is also a third interest that suffers when a substantial percentage 
of defendants never voice their perspective on the events that led them to 
court: the interest of the criminal justice system in developing an 
accurate perception of its street-level effects. Criminal practitioners, 
judges, and lawmakers are constantly striving to fine tune the workings 
of the criminal justice system. These efforts would benefit from the 
voices of defendants who (along with crime victims) are the primary 
"consumers" of that system. By encouraging defendants to remain silent 
throughout the process, the system suffers an "institutional loss of 
information about defendant perceptions and experiences" that decreases 
any potential recognition of what works, what does not work, and what 
should be changed. 19 Society, as represented by the thousands of jurors 
who move through the criminal justice system each day, would also 
benefit from hearing defendants' stories in order to better understand 
how various policies, e.g., "the war on drugs," are being implemented. 
In this sense, opening the door to more defendants' voices could provide 
untold advantages in terms of future political and legal reforms. 
In contrast to these clear advantages of defendant testimony, there 
appear to be few, if any, valid reasons to discourage such testimony.20 
with a suspected person to hear his side of the story."); cf Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2637 ("Criminal 
cases aside, there are apparently no investigative or fact·finding proceedings in which asking questions 
and expecting answers is regarded as dirty business."); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 332 
(1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) {"If I ask my son whether he saw a movie I had forbidden him to watch, 
and he remains silent, the import of his silence is clear."). 
While defendants are permitted to speak on their own behalf at sentencing, the defendant's 
right to allocute at sentencing is generally displaced by a mixed legal and factual presentation of defense 
counsel, who often discourage lengthy client statements that could interfere with this presentation-
promoting instead, "either complete silence or a truncated, inauthentic version of the defendant's 
feelings about the case." Natapoff, supra note I, at 1466, 1468. 
18. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1450-51, 1493-95 (noting that "[c]ourts and scholars typically 
treat" the silencing of defendants "as a victory for defendants" but that "[ d]efendants who remain silent 
throughout the legal process are less likely to understand their own cases, engage the dictates of the law 
intellectually, accept the legitimacy of the outcomes, feel remorse, or change as a result of the 
experience'} 
19. See id. at 1457, 1487 ("Criminal defendants are excluded from the 'marketplace of ideas' that 
shapes the criminal justice system."). An additional disadvantage of a system that celebrates defendant 
silence is that it undermines the civic ideal of cooperation with authorities. See R. Kent Greenawalt, 
Silence As a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 15, 49-50 (1981) (arguing that 
the symbol of silence in the face of authority while favorable in some respects has a "harmful side" in 
that it "may weaken the sense that obedience to law is something more than the bad man's calculation of 
most likely advantage"). 
20. The primary argument for broadly encouraging trial silence is that such silence protects not 
only the irrefutably guilty, but also a subset of innocent defendants whose low sophistication and 
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In fact, the primary beneficiaries of a legal system that discourages 
defendant testimony is a small subset of guilty defendants who, because 
they have no plausible defense, would not testify under any legal 
regime. By providing numerous tactical advantages to defendants who 
remain silent that have little to do with guilt or innocence, the current 
system primarily aids the cause of these hopelessly guilty defendants by 
lending credence to the belief that even innocent defendants remain 
silent at trial. 
II. A TALE OF Two RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND THE RIGHT NOT 
TO TESTIFY 
One of the most surprising aspects of the American criminal justice 
system's essentially punitive patchwork of rules governing defendant 
testimony is how little of the current system is dictated by its 
constitutional or historical roots. To highlight the degree to which 
modem jurisprudence has strayed from those roots, and simultaneously 
to sketch the constitutional parameters of the defendant's decision to 
testify or remain silent, this Part briefly summarizes the history of the 
two countervailing rights at issue. 
personal mannerisms are such that even armed with the truth, they will appear guilty under the skilled 
questioning of a prosecutor. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.IS (1981) (recognizing 
"' [ e ]xcessive timidity'" and "'nervousness when facing others"' as traits potentially likely to betray an 
innocent defendant who takes the stand (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893))); 
Schulhofer, supra note I, at 330 (arguing that some innocent defendants may be better off not testifying 
because, inter alia, they "may look sleazy" have a "vague memory" of events or be "inarticulate, 
nervous or easily intimidated"); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 922-23 ("[E]ven a good lawyer cannot 
always save an innocent but unpersuasive-sounding client from being demolished on the stand."). This 
narrative of innocent, but overly anxious, defendants who must be protected from their own testimony is 
unpersuasive for at least three reasons . First, the suggestion that truthful testimony should be 
discouraged because it may be disbelieved is overbroad as it applies to every witness, not just 
defendants. It is thought, however, that generally applicable trial rules, such as limits on cross-
examination (the attorney sponsoring the witness may object to irrelevant, argumentative questions, etc.) 
overseen by a neutral judge, and allowing the sponsoring attorney to clarify witness testimony on 
redirect examination, obviate this problem; if this process works for witnesses generally, there is no 
reason to believe it would not work for defendants. Second, this justification for trial silence ignores 
that lay jurors, no doubt having just experienced some form of "stage-fright" during voir dire, are fully 
equipped to understand such factors as a particular defendant's relative lack of sophistication or 
nervousness when placed on trial, and these concerns can be fully brought out by defense counsel on 
direct examination. Third, as with a significant witness in any case, competent counsel should be 
expected to prepare a defendant for cross-examination in advance of trial (and to seek out corroboration 
for the defendant's testimony), decreasing the likelihood that a defendant who speaks the truth will be 
made to appear guilty by virtue of prosecutorial questioning. See also infra note 130 (suggesting ways 
to mitigate prejudice that might result when a defendant declines to testify for reasons other than guilt of 
the charged crime). 
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A. The Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify 
In the American courts as they existed at the time of the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights, and in the decades that followed, the question of the 
proper incentives and disincentives to apply to a criminal defendant's 
testimony was resolved by the simple, elegant, and, as it turns out, 
unconstitutional solution of prohibiting any sworn testimony by the 
accused. Defendants at the end of the eighteenth century were not faced 
with anything approximating the contemporary dilemma of whether or 
not to testify because they were simply "disqualified from testifying 
under oath."21 
As recent scholarship has demonstrated, however, this prohibition of 
sworn testimony presents a somewhat incomplete picture of trials of the 
period. In truth, a defendant's sworn testimony would have been 
somewhat redundant in late eighteenth century trials. Defendants were 
expected to provide a "pretrial statement" to a justice of the peace 
detailing their account of the events in question, and "typically spoke 
and conducted their defense personally, without counsel," invariably 
presenting "their story" to the jurors.22 Thus, while defendants were 
forbidden the right to testify, the courts of the time were not so foolhardy 
as to deprive themselves of any useful factual information a defendant 
might provide.23 Indeed, while defendants' sworn testimony was 
prohibited, their unsworn statements were practically compelled. 
Usually deprived of counsel and subject to having the pretrial statement 
(or lack thereof) referred to at trial, a defendant's "refusal to respond" 
through unsworn statements to incriminating charges "would have been 
suicidal. "24 
21. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61,66 (2000) (observing that at time of the adoption of the Bill 
of Rights, "what [defendants] said at trial was not considered to be evidence, since they were 
disqualified from testifying under oath"); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971) ("(A]t the 
time of framing of the Fifth Amendment and for many years thereafter the accused in criminal cases was 
not allowed to testify in his own behalf."); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) ("The right of an 
accused to testify in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the preceding 
century, criminal defendants in this country, as at common law, were considered to be disqualified from 
giving sworn testimony at their own trial by reason of their interest as a party to the case."). 
22. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66; see generally Langbein, supra note 4; Alschuler, supra note 4. 
23. Cf Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956) ("The Founders of the Nation 
were not naive or disregardful of the interests of justice."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) 
("There is no war between the Constitution and common sense."). 
24. Langbein, supra note 4, at I 048-49 ("Undergirding the criminal procedure of the early 
modem trial at common law was a set of rules and practices whose purpose and effect were to oblige the 
accused to respond to the charges against him."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2631 ("Until the nineteenth 
century was well underway, magistrates and judges in ... America expected and encouraged suspects 
and defendants to speak during pretrial interrogation and again at trial. Fact finders did not hesitate to 
draw inferences of guilt when defendants remained silent. The informal inducements of prenineteenth 
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In the latter part of the nineteenth century, this procedural landscape 
was altered by the enactment of statutes permitting defendants to give 
sworn testimony in federal court and state courts, excepting only 
Georgia. 25 The reformers who spearheaded this change did not 
necessarily intend to assist criminal defendants; in fact, one of the 
leading advocates for reform argued that defendants' incompetence to 
testify had "served the guilty as a shield" from cross-examination "and 
thus disserved the public interest."26 Conversely, the greater part of 
those opposing the reform believed allowing defendants to testify under 
oath "threatened erosion of the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the presumption of innocence."27 
The proponents of reform, of course, carried the day and, indeed, the 
century as the law regarding defendants' testimony was turned upside 
down, and it became "the considered consensus of the English-speaking 
world" that "there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn 
testimony of the accused."28 Bowing to this consensus, the Supreme 
Court gradually enshrined the opportunity to testify under oath with 
century trial procedure were, moreover, great enough that virtually every defendant did speak."); 
Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66 ("Defendants [at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights] routinely were 
asked (and agreed) to provide a pretrial statement to a justice of the peace detailing the events in 
dispute. . . . If their story at trial-where they typically spoke and conducted their defense personally, 
without counsel-differed from their pretrial statement, the contradiction could be noted." (internal 
citations omitted)); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 333 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The 
justice of the peace testified at trial as to the content of the· defendant's (pre-trial] statement; if the 
defendant refused to speak, this would also have been reported to the jury."). 
25. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961) ("Before the end of the century every State 
except Georgia had abolished the disqualification."); Nix, 475 U.S. at 164 ("By the end of the 19th 
century . . . the disqualification was finally abolished by statute in most states and in the federal 
courts."). A federal statute permitting defendants to give sworn testimony was enacted in 1878. See 18 
U .S.C. § 3481 (2000) ("In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the 
United States ... the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. His failure to 
make such request shall not create any presumption against him."). 
With the advent of these reforms and the more frequent participation of defense counsel in 
criminal trials, the pretrial statement gradually fell into disuse. See Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 66 ("The 
pretrial statement did not begin to fall into disuse until the 1830's .... "); cf Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 586 
("'The system of allowing a prisoner to make a statement had been introduced as a mere makeshift, by 
way of mitigating the intolerable hardship which occasionally resulted from the prisoner not being able 
to speak on his own behalf."'). 
26. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577, 580 (describing position of John Appleton, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Maine and disciple of Jeremy Bentham, who spearheaded the reform in Maine leading 
to the first statute "in the English-speaking world" permitting criminal defendant testimony). 
27. !d. at 578. In the wake of this reform, many who had opposed it on this ground came to 
rethink their views, accepting that "innocence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the opportunity of 
the accused to testify under oath." !d. at 580-81. 
28. !d. at 582; Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1895) ("The old law was that 
interest debarred one from testifying, for fear that such interest might tend to a perversion of the truth. 
A more enlightened spirit has thrown down this barrier, and now mere interest does not exclude one 
from the witness stand, but the interest is to be considered as affecting his credibility."). 
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constitutional status, finally holding in 1987 that "[t]he right to testify on 
one's own behalf at a criminal trial," while not explicitly referenced in 
the constitutional text, is guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 29 
B. The Defendant's Constitutional Right Not to Testify 
A defendant's right not to testify has a more distinguished pedigree 
than its younger relation the right to testify, beginning with its firm 
textual source in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that 
commands that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself."30 The right also has deep historical roots, 
representing a tangible result of the political abuses America's founders 
fought to eliminate.31 
The right to remain silent in the face of accusation has been widely 
celebrated in American law, representing in the words of the Supreme 
Court "an important advance in the development of our liberty" and 
'"one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself 
civilized. "'32 As famously stated, the right, among other things, protects 
the guilty defendant from "the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury 
or contempt," by allowing the guilty to sit silently while "'requiring the 
government ... to shoulder the entire load"' of a criminal prosecution.33 
29. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,49-51 (1987) (ruling that "[a]t this point in the development 
of our adversary system, it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the 
witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense," while noting that this was "a change from the 
historic common-law view, which was that all parties to litigation, including criminal defendants, were 
disqualified from testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the trial"). Although the Court 
had repeatedly assumed or hinted that a defendant had a constitutional right to testify prior to the 
decision in Rock, see, e.g., Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,225 (1971), it 
had not explicitly held that there was such a right or designated its source in the Constitution. See Nix, 
475 U.S. at 164 (noting in 1986 that Court had "never explicitly held" the right existed, although it had 
"suggested" its existence); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993) ("The right to 
testify on one's own behalf in a criminal proceeding is ... a right implicit in the Constitution.") (citing 
Rock and Nix); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2664. 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964). 
31. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) ("So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient 
system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one accord, 
made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a 
maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the 
impregnability of a constitutional enactment."). 
32. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1956); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 . 
33. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 . The Supreme Court's celebratory statements, which have been 
relied upon to promote an expansive interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, have been critiqued by 
numerous observers as essentially sloganeering. See, e.g., Henry 1. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment 
Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. C!N. L. REV. 671, 682-695 (1968) (critiquing the 
rationales provided by the Supreme Court and others to support an expansive Fifth Amendment 
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The Court has emphasized that the values protected by the right not to 
testify are so important that they easily overcome the fact that it may on 
occasion "save a guilty man from his just des[ s ]erts. "34 
At least with respect to the defendant's testimony at trial, the 
implications of the Fifth Amendment right have long been clear: "The 
freedom of a defendant in a criminal trial to remain silent 'unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will' is guaranteed 
by the Fifth Amendment and made applicable to state criminal 
proceedings through the Fourteenth."35 
Ill. UNEQUAL RIGHTS: BURDENS ON DEFENDANT TESTIMONY AND 
REwARDS FOR DEFENDANT SILENCE 
Although both the right to testify and the right to remain silent at trial 
share nominally equivalent status as constitutional rights, the two rights 
have not been treated equally. The Supreme Court has permitted severe 
burdens to be placed on the right to testify, while prohibiting the 
placement of equivalent burdens on the right to remain silent at trial.36 
In light of the complex and unequal treatment of the two rights, 
criminal defendants are now faced with a dizzying array of legal rules 
that shape the already complicated tactical calculus of whether or not to 
testify. As detailed below, in evaluating the implications of these rules, 
a properly advised defendant who wishes to testify must consider not 
only the numerous legal burdens that attach should he do so, but also the 
many court-created benefits of remaining silent that will be foregone. 
A. Impeachment With Prior Convictions 
The most widely recognized and stark disincentive to taking the 
witness stand is that if, and in most cases only if, a defendant testifies, 
the prosecution can then inform the jury of the defendant's prior 
criminal convictions.37 While often viewed solely as a product of the 
jurisprudence as "mere rhetoric," "largely conclusory," and, in sum, a "rather slender basis" for then-
existing doctrine); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 892 (characterizing analgous arguments in favor of 
expansive Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as "more like slogans that merely restate the rule than 
considered rationales"). 
34. Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 426-28. 
35. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 
(1964)). 
36. See Natapoff, supra note I, at 1483 ("[T]he Court's protection of the defendant's right to 
speak is markedly weaker than its protection of the right to remain silent."). 
37. See FED. R. EVID. 609; United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 183-84(4th Cir. 1991), 
rev'd on other grounds, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) ("[T]here are many reasons unrelated to guilt that may 
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rule permitting credibility impeachment with prior convictions-Federal 
Rule of Evidence 60938-this disincentive to testifying is, in fact, the 
product of two separate rules, one favoring defendants and the other 
favoring the prosecution. 39 
The rule favoring defendants is that if the defendant elects not to 
testify, evidence of previous malfeasance, including prior convictions, is 
generally inadmissible. More specifically, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404, "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith."40 This rule represents a defendant-friendly 
policy determination that precludes admission of prior crimes as 
substantive, propensity evidence.41 As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the inquiry into propensity "is not rejected because character 
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury 
and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge. "42 
Absent the policy-based prohibition contained in Rule 404, evidence 
of criminal convictions would presumably be admissible to prove that a 
defendant with a criminal record committed a subsequent charged crime 
whether or not the defendant testified at trial.43 Under such a regime, 
militate against testifying. Chief among these is the prosecution's power to impeach the defendant's 
credibility with prior convictions under Fed. R. Evid. 609."). 
38. While this Article examines the problem of defendant trial silence primarily through analysis 
of the federal criminal trial system, the discussion would be essentially identical with respect to criminal 
trials in state courts as those courts are bound by the constitutional rulings of the federal Supreme Court 
discussed herein and employ statutory rules of evidence and procedure that, with a handful of 
exceptions, are substantially similar to the federal rules. See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial 
Hearsay: The Constitutional Boundaries Of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 884, n.36 
(2008) (noting that "[f]orty-two states have adopted rules of evidence patterned on the Federal Rules"). 
39. See United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Two conflicting rules of 
evidence are responsible for this situation. The first is that a prior criminal conviction is irrelevant to 
prove whether or not defendant is guilty of the crime charged. Such evidence is therefore initially 
inadmissible. The other rule is that the credibility of any witness may be impeached by evidence of his 
prior criminal convictions. The evidence is therefore admissible, after the witness testifies. The conflict 
between these two rules thrusts the defendant onto the horns of a dilemma."). 
40. FED. R. Evm. 404(b); see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion .... "). 
41. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,475-76 (1948); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
860 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the "[r]ules of evidence are ... weighted in the 
defendant's favor" and giving as an example that "the prosecution generally cannot introduce evidence 
of the defendant's character to prove his propensity to commit a crime, but the defendant can introduce 
such reputation evidence to show his law-abiding nature"). 
42. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76. 
43. If the protections of Rule 404 were eliminated, the Supreme Court might then preclude such 
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the potential that a defendant would be impeached with prior convictions 
would, of course, have no bearing on the decision whether or not to 
testify.44 Given the general prohibition of evidence of a defendant's 
prior convictions as substantive evidence, however, a rule permitting the 
use of that evidence to impeach a testifying defendant assumes great 
significance in deterring even innocent defendants from testifying.45 
Although criticized for decades by commentators,46 the practice of 
impeaching testifying defendants with prior convictions has long been 
propensity evidence on constitutional grounds. To date, the Supreme Court has declined to reach this 
question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (declining to decide "whether a state law 
would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes' evidence to show 
propensity to commit a charged crime"); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572-75 (1967), (Warren, C.J., 
dissenting and concurring) ("While this Court has never held that the use of prior convictions to show 
nothing more than a disposition to commit crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory power over criminal trials in federal 
courts, as well as decisions by courts of appeals and of state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes 
introduced for no purpose other than to show criminal disposition would violate the Due Process 
Clause."); McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that rule prohibiting 
adverse character evidence is so "historically grounded" as to be constitutionally based). A recent 
development that signals the absence of a constitutional prohibition on such propensity evidence is the 
federal appellate courts' upholding of the constitutionality of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 
which allow evidence of the defendant's prior commission of rape and sexual assault (Rule 413), and 
child molestation (Rule 414) to be used as propensity evidence in a subsequent prosecution for those 
offenses. See United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). 
44. Lerner, supra note 4, at 824 (noting the fact that a defendant's criminal record is considered 
in the French criminal justice system regardless of whether the defendant testifies as one of the 
"incentives" in that system for the defendant to testify). 
45. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.l5 (1981) (noting that "fear of 
impeachment by prior convictions (the petitioner's fear in the present case)'' dissuades defendants from 
testifying); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) ("'Defendant contends that the reason a 
defendant refuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced in evidence to impeach him 
and not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that the defendant might fear that his prior 
convictions will prejudice the jury, and therefore another possible inference can be drawn from his 
refusal to take the stand."' (quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763 (Cal. 1965)) (internal citation 
omitted)). 
46. See, e.g., Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to TestifY and 
Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. I, 62--63 ( 1997) (contending that impeachment by 
prior convictions places an intolerable burden on the right to testify); Friedman, supra note I 0, at 678 
(arguing that impeachment of defendants with prior convictions should be precluded because 
"[ c ]haracter impeachment evidence of an accused has virtually no probative value with respect to 
credibility, but its availability has tremendous prejudicial impact"); Robert D. Dodson, What Went 
Wrong with Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction 
Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. I, 51 (1999) (endorsing "a per se rule disallowing prior conviction 
evidence"); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice 
in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982) (suggesting that "the impeachment rubric is a 
hoax, merely a cover for the admission of evidence bearing on propensity-which is what the rule's 
defenders are probably seeking"); Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 58 (arguing that "innocent defendants in 
many American jurisdictions are deterred from testifying by the unjust practice of allowing prior 
convictions to be routinely admitted to impeach a defendant's credibility"); cf Spencer v. Texas, 385 
U.S. 554, 577 ( 1967) (recognizing that "the theory justifying admission of evidence of prior convictions 
to impeach a defendant's credibility has been criticized"). 
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accepted by the courts and is now firmly entrenched in the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.47 Rule 609 permits impeachment of the credibility of all 
witnesses, including criminal defendants, with convictions for crimes 
that involve so-called crimen falsi, "proof or admission of an act of 
dishonesty or false statement," as well as convictions for all crimes 
punishable by more than one year in prison.48 With respect to this 
second category--essentially all felonies-the Rule in subsection (a)(l) 
states that, for purposes of impeaching a testifying defendant, such 
convictions "shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused. '.49 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the prospect of "cross-
examination, including impeachment by prior convictions ... may deter 
a defendant from taking the stand,"50 but has nonetheless concluded that 
the practice does not create an unconstitutional burden on the right to 
testify.51 It bases this conclusion on a rough equality of witnesses 
47. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757 (2000) ("[O]nce the defendant testifies, she is 
subject to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior convictions .... "); McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) ("It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the 
stand in his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like."); United States v. 
Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Although firmly entrenched in criminal justice 
procedures, the admission of prior conviction evidence to impeach the defendant's credibility has been 
persistently criticized in recent years .... "; "Regardless of any criticism, the use of prior conviction 
evidence to impeach credibility is generally accepted as fair and proper."). 
48. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). 
49. !d. at 609(a)(l). Under this Rule, impeachment of a testifying defendant with his prior 
convictions has become relatively routine practice. See Greenawalt, supra note 19, at 58 (arguing that 
prior convictions are now "routinely admitted to impeach a defendant's credibility"); Ed Gainor, 
Character Evidence by Any Other Name ... : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction 
Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 762, 767, 780 (1990) (contending that "many courts have 
tended to admit virtually any prior felony for impeachment on the basis that the defendant's credibility is 
in issue-as, indeed, it virtually always will be, if the defendant denies the charges against him"; and 
that "[f]ederal courts of appeals have rarely reversed a trial judge's decision to admit evidence of prior 
convictions for impeachment"); see 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 6134 (1993) (emphasizing that in most cases, where trial courts "at least 
claimed" to have "considered both probative value and prejudice" the "appellate courts usually defer to 
the decision of the trial court if there is any way to rationalize the balance struck"); Jeffrey Bellin, How 
the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 
U.C. DAVIS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008) (critiquing federal.courts.' jurisprudence under Rule 
609(a)(l)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=ll31742. 
50. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757, 759-60; see also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 609 (1972) 
("[A] defendant's choice to take the stand carries with it serious risks of impeachment and cross-
examination."). 
51. See Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757, 759-60 ("It is not thought overly harsh in such situations to 
require that the determination whether to waive the privilege take into account the matters which may be 
brought out on cross-examination. It is also generally recognized that a defendant who takes the stand in 
his own behalf may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like .... Again, it is not thought 
inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the defendant to weigh 
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principle that celebrates "treating testifying defendants the same as other 
witnesses."52 In applying this principle, the Court appears unconcerned 
that defendants are unlike any other witnesses in a number of respects, 
including that they possess a constitutional right to testify and are 
singularly prejudiced by the ready susceptibility of prior conviction 
impeachment to improper use as propensity evidence. 53 
While the efficacy and fairness of impeachment with prior 
convictions is a subject of much debate, what cannot be denied is that 
allowing most prior convictions to be used solely to impeach a testifying 
defendant creates a powerful incentive for defendants, both innocent and 
guilty, to remain silent.54 In essence, defendants with a criminal record 
such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify." (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 
(1971))); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,213 (1971) ("It does no violence to the privilege that a 
person's choice to testify in his own behalf may open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence," 
including prior convictions). The Supreme Court of Hawaii holds a contrary view and has ruled that "to 
convict a criminal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his credibility as a 
witness violates the accused's constitutional right to testify in his own defense." State v. Santiago, 492 
P.2d 657,661 (Haw. 1971). A handful of states have adopted Hawaii's approach in generally barring 
impeachment of testifying defendants with prior convictions. See Dodson, supra note 46, at 51 (citing 
Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia, and Montana as the sole jurisdictions that depart from the 
federal rule generally permitting such impeachment). 
52. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000); id. at 69, 73 (noting that "[w]ith respect to 
issues of credibility," defendants are treated "the same as other witnesses"); see also Brown v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 148, 155 (1958) ("If [a defendant] takes the stand and testifies in his own defense his 
credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness . . . ."); 
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900) ("[W]e know of no reason why an accused person 
who takes the stand as a witness should not be subject to cross-examination as other witnesses are."); 
Reagan v. United States, !57 U.S. 301, 305 (1895) (if the defendant chooses to "avail himself of this 
privilege [to testify], his credibility may be impeached, his testimony may be assailed, and is to be 
weighed as that of any other witness. Assuming the position of a witness, he is entitled to all its rights 
and protections, and is subject to all its criticisms and burdens .... His credibility may be impeached, 
and by the same methods as are pursued in the case of any other witness."). 
53. See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.ll (1972) ('"The sharpest and most prejudicial 
impact of the practice of impeachment by conviction ... is upon one particular type of witness, namely, 
the accused in a criminal case who elects to take the stand."' (quoting C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE§ 43, 
at 93 (1954))); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 289 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority 
for "lumping together of defendants with all other witnesses" because "it ignores the pivotal fact that the 
Sixth Amendment accords defendants constitutional rights above and beyond those accorded witnesses 
generally"); Pfotzer v. Aqua Sys., Inc., 162 F.2d 779, 785 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned Hand, J.) ("[S]o far as 
we can see, the greater number of jurisdictions allow the conviction as evidence to impeach a 
witness .... Whether the attempt is ever practicable to limit its use to the witness's credibility, and 
whether, if not, its use is an injustice, are not open questions for us."); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(l) 
(requiring district courts to consider admission of conviction under a more rigorous standard when 
conviction is that of the accused than for any other trial witnesses). 
54. Adding to the burden Rule 609 places on defendant testimony, the Supreme Court has 
diminished a tactical advantage normally available in these circumstances-the practice of eliminating 
"the sting" of prior conviction evidence by bringing that evidence in on direct examination-by ruling 
that when the defense engages in this practice, it forfeits any ability to later challenge the trial court's 
ruling permitting the impeachment. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 759-{;0. 
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must choose between their constitutional right to testify and their 
statutory right to keep prior convictions from coming before the jury.55 
B. Cross-Examination With Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, defendants considering 
whether or not to take the witness stand must ponder not only the likely 
impact of their testimony on direct examination, but also the impact of 
cross-examination. This is because "[ o ]nee a defendant takes the stand, 
he is 'subject to cross-examination impeaching his credibility just like 
any other witness.'"56 Thus, when a '"defendant places himself at the 
very heart of the trial process'"57 by testifying, the prosecutor will test 
the defendant's statements through cross-examination, a process 
famously described as the "'greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth. "'58 Cross-examination, of course, does not stop with 
impeachment by prior convictions, and includes as well a vigorous 
rhetorical challenge to any perceived inconsistencies or inaccuracies in 
55. See State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 660 (Haw. 1971) (recognizing that permitting 
impeachment with prior convictions, "puts the criminal defendant who has prior convictions in a 
tremendous dilemma" and "(a]ny defendant who has prior convictions will therefore feel constrained not 
to take the stand"); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasizing that the 
potential of impeachment with prior convictions if the defendant testifies "thrusts the defendant onto the 
horns of a dilemma"); Hornstein, supra note 46, at 62--{;3 ("[P]ermitting impeachment by prior 
conviction is likely to deprive the jury of whatever evidence a defendant might offer on the question of 
guilt or innocence by compelling the defendant to 'waive' the constitutional right to testify on pain of 
suffering the prejudice of having the jury learn of his or her criminal past.") . That this tradeoff is 
permitted demonstrates the disfavored status of the right to testify. The Supreme Court would surely 
never permit the opposite situation-where prior convictions would be admissible only if the defendant 
did not testify, as this would constitute too great a burden on the right to remain silent. See Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (accused must be permitted to "remain silent 'unless he chooses to 
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will'" (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 8 (I 964))). 
56. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 70 (2000) (quoting Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 
235-36 (1980)). A witness "may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination when questioned about the details." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 
321 ( 1999); Brown, 356 U.S. at 155-56 (recognizing that a witness "'has no right to set forth to the jury 
all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those 
facts '" and that this rule applies "to a witness in any proceeding who voluntarily takes the stand and 
offers testimony in his own behalf' (quoting Fitzpatrick, 178 U.S. at 315)); Fitzpatrick, 178 U.S. at 315 
("Where an accused party waives his constitutional privilege of silence, takes the stand in his own behalf 
and makes his own statement, it is clear that the prosecution has a right to cross-examine upon such 
statement with the same latitude as would be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness, as to the 
circumstances connecting him with the alleged crime."). 
57. Perry, 488 U.S. at 283 (holding that trial court could instruct defendant not to consult with 
his counsel during recess in testimony because "'[o]nce the defendant places himself at the very heart of 
the trial process, it only comports with basic fairness that the story presented on direct is measured for 
its accuracy and completeness by uninfluenced testimony on cross-examination'" (quoting United States 
v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mishler, J. concurring))). 
58. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367). 
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the defendant's testimony. 
In cross-examining the defendant, the proser.utor has the upper hand. 
The testifying defendant has a transparent bias in favor of acquittal, and 
the prosecutor can call upon a vast array of resources to expose any false 
or misleading testimony-an effort that if successful will likely prove 
disastrous to the defense cause.59 
Adding to the numerous tools available to a prosecutor for cross-
examination, the Supreme Court has permitted impeachment of 
testifying defendants with a wide range of evidence (in addition to prior 
convictions) otherwise precluded in a criminal trial. One category of 
such evidence is unlawfully obtained evidence, including: (i) statements 
obtained in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona;60 (ii) statements obtained in violation of a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel;61 and (iii) physical 
evidence seized in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights.62 This evidence, although prohibited in the prosecution's case in 
chief, is generally admissible (as impeachment) on cross-examination, in 
rebuttal, or both if, and only if, a defendant testifies. 
The Court has recognized that these judicially crafted exceptions to 
the exclusionary rules-rules that are intended to safeguard the 
citizenry's constitutional rights by deterring constitutional violations-
may detract somewhat from the constitutional principles the rules are 
meant to uphold. Nevertheless, the Court has held some marginal 
59. See James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, 
Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1354-55 (1992) (contending that "(a]ny suggestion of 
peijury in any fashion connected to the defense is powerful affirmative proof' and noting that "(c]lassic 
jury instructions" invite the factfinder to use peijury, falsification of evidence and the like as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt, i.e., affirmative evidence of guilt); United States v. Clark, 45 FJd 1247, 1251 
(8th Cir. 1995) ("(A]dverse inferences will inevitably be drawn from disbelief of a defendant's trial 
testimony .... "). One advantage the defendant does possess is surprise, in that there is generally no 
requirement that the defense reveal the defendant's testimony (or even his intention to testify) in 
advance. This tactical advantage has been called "practically illusory," however, in light of "the 
government's broad investigatory powers" including the availability of pretrial police interrogation of 
the accused and potential defense witnesses, and "the requirement in many states that the defenses of 
alibi and insanity must be specially pleaded." Abraham S. Goldstein, The State And The Accused: 
Balance Of Advantage In Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1192 (1960). 
60. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975). 
61. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990). The Supreme Court emphasizes that 
impeachment is allowed because the violation is with respect to a "procedural safeguard" designed to 
enforce the Sixth Amendment, not the amendment itself. /d. Similarly, "a defendant's compelled 
statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put to any testimonial 
use whatever against him in a criminal trial." New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 ( 1979). 
62. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 
627-28 (1980) (holding that even where defendant's direct examination testimony did not directly 
implicate illegally seized evidence, impeachment was proper as long as the topic was "reasonably 
suggested by the defendant's direct examination"). 
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deterrence of constitutional violations must be sacrificed to avoid 
"impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal 
trial" and the undermining of "the proper functioning of the adversary 
system" that would occur if a defendant is able to testify without being 
subject to all available impeachment. 63 
Further eroding the desirability of testifying in particular cases, courts 
have also held that the defendant's appearance on the witness stand also 
triggers cross-examination with otherwise irrelevant or precluded 
evidence, such as: (i) the defendant's prearrest and postarrest silence;64 
(ii) the defendant's failure to testify at a previous trial;65 (iii) the 
defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing;66 and (iv) the 
63. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627. The Supreme Court regularly uses a sword/shield analogy: "If a 
defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf,"' he is precluded from '"tum[ing] the illegal 
method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and 
provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths."' Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (quoting 
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,224 (1971)); Walder, 347 U.S. at 65. The Court has emphasized the 
significance of deterring peljury to justify these rulings, explaining that "[a]ll perjured relevant 
testimony is at war with justice, since it may produce a judgment not resting on truth," and that "a 
defendant's use of [peljured] testimony [is] so antithetical to our system of justice" that the prosecution 
must be "permitted ... to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to combat it." Nix v. Whiteside, 
475 U.S. 157, 185 (1986) (emphasis added). 
64. While the rules regarding impeachment are clear, the use of prearrest and postarrest silence 
in the prosecution's case in chief is the subject of a complex and unsettled jurisprudence. Postarrest 
silence is constitutionally prohibited in the prosecution's case in chief if the defendant demonstrates the 
receipt of Miranda warnings. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 
U.S. 284, 295 ( 1986) (Florida prosecutor's use of defendant's postarrest post-Miranda warnings silence 
as evidence of defendant's sanity violated due process). There is no clear rule with respect to prearrest 
silence. See Frank S. Ward, Constitutional Law-United States v. McCann: Is the Fifth Amendment 
Violated When Pre-a"est Silence Is Used as Substantive Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Guilt?, 28 
AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 269, 269 (2004) ("In the absence of clear direction from the Supreme Court, the 
federal circuit courts are split on when pre-arrest silence may be used 'as substantive evidence of 
guilt."'). In Jenkins v. Anderson, the Court held that a defendant can be impeached with prearrest 
silence, but explicitly declined to decide "whether or under what circumstances prearrest silence" could 
be used in other contexts. 447 U.S. 231, 236 n.2 (1980). 
65. !d. at 235; Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). 
66. Under Simmons v. United States, "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to 
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against 
him at trial on the issue of guilt." 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). The Court has not determined whether 
such testimony may be used to impeach a testifying defendant, but this result logically follows from the 
Court's other decisions, as a number of courts have recognized. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 940 
F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Beltran-Gutierrez, 19 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (lith Cir. 1982). An analogous line of 
authority prohibits the use of a defendant's statements establishing financial eligibility for appointed 
counsel to be used in the prosecution's case in chief. See United States v. Hardwell 80 F.3d 1471, 
1484 (I Oth Cir. 1996) (reversing conviction where prosecution introduced defendant's financial 
eligibility statements to "prove guilt at trial" and recognizing "weight of authority from other circuits" 
establishing impermissibility of such use). Presumably such statements would, again, be permissible as 
impeachment. 
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defendant's demeanor during the trial.67 Finally, impeachment with the 
otherwise inadmissible evidence noted above has not been limited to 
direct contradictions of a defendant's direct examination testimony, but 
is more generally allowed whenever the subject matter that encompasses 
the impeachment was "reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct 
examination. "68 
Thus, in addition to creating the potential for impeachment with prior 
convictions, a defendant who takes the witness stand opens up the trial 
to illegally seized evidence and otherwise inadmissible evidence such as 
testimony at a suppression hearing and postarrest silence. Such 
evidence, while ostensibly admitted solely for impeachment, carries with 
it substantial risks of additional prejudice if improperly considered by 
the jury as substantive evidence of guilt. These considerations, of 
course, function to deter defendants from taking the witness stand by 
increasing the tactical disadvantages to doing so and decreasing the 
ultimate weight of any testimony a defendant offers.69 
67. See Cunningham v. Perini, 655 F.2d 98, 100 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Until a defendant has placed 
his own demeanor in evidence by taking the stand to testify, his personal appearance at the trial is 
irrelevant to the question of his guilt or innocence."); United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (barring prosecutor from making statements regarding defendant's conduct during trial 
because "fear of such statements in closing argument, will tend to eviscerate the right to remain silent by 
forcing the defendant to take the stand in reaction to or in contemplation of the prosecutor's 
comments"). 
68. Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-28 ("[A] defendant's statements made in response to proper cross-
examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination are subject to otherwise proper 
impeachment by the government, albeit by evidence that has been illegally obtained and that is 
inadmissible on the government's direct case, or otherwise, as substantive evidence of guilt."). The 
holding of Havens was the final nail in the coffin of an earlier holding in Agnello v. United States, 269 
U.S. 20, 35 (1925), that had suggested that illegally obtained evidence could only be used to impeach a 
directly contradictory statement uttered on direct examination. See Kainen, supra note 59, at 1368 
(advocating "[e]liminating the impeachment exception[s] and returning to Agnello"). 
69. The Supreme Court, while recognizing that these rules will enter the defendant's calculus in 
determining whether to testify, downplays the resulting dilemma, asserting that a defendant's decision 
"not to take the witness stand because of the risk of cross-examination" is merely "a choice of litigation 
tactics." Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238; Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 757, 759-{)0 (2000) 
(recognizing that the defendant must "take into account the matters which may be brought out on cross-
examination" including that he "may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the like" and stating 
that "it is not thought inconsistent with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require the 
defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to testify" (quoting McGautha v. California, 
402 u.s. 183,215 (1971))). 
In accordance with the case law's peculiar inclination to burden only the defendant"s 
testimony, the Supreme Court ruled in James v. Illinois that illegally obtained evidence cannot be used 
to impeach defense witnesses other than the defendant. 493 U.S. 307, 315 (1990). 
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C. Trial Courts and Prosecutors May Not Comment Adversely on a 
Defendant's Refusal to TestifY 
In sharp contrast to the meager protections granted to the defendant's 
right to testify, the courts have been extraordinarily protective of the 
right not to testify.70 One of the most significant examples of this robust 
protection is the preclusion of any adverse judicial or prosecutorial 
comment on a failure to testify, a relatively recent addition to 
constitutional law arising from the 1965 Supreme Court decision in 
Griffin v. California. 71 
The Griffin decision concerned a state murder trial at which the 
defendant did not testify despite the fact that the evidence placed him in 
an alley with the victim on the evening of her death. The prosecutor, in 
summation, made a point of the refusal to testify in light of the 
defendant's presumed knowledge of the particulars of the victim's 
demise, including, of course, whether he murdered her. 72 The 
prosecutor argued, "[I]n the whole world, if anybody would know, this 
defendant would know" what happened to the victim, and yet he "has 
not seen fit to take the stand and deny or explain" the events of that 
night. 73 In accordance with California law, the trial judge then 
instructed the jury: 
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can 
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his 
knowledge, if he does not testify ... the jury may take that failure into 
consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as 
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn 
therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable. 74 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the resulting conviction, 
cQncluding that the prosecutor's argument as buttressed by the trial 
court's instruction constituted "a penalty imposed by courts for 
70. As an example of the contrasting treatment, while the Court has vigorously protected a 
defendant's freedom to remain silent '"unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own 
will,"' it has never suggested that there is a similar freedom to testifY '"unless he chooses to [remain 
silent] in the unfettered -exercise-ofhis own wilL"' Carterv. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305{1981). 
71. 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (stating that the Fifth Amendment precludes "either comment by 
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of 
guilt"). Griffin was foreshadowed by an 1893 decision, Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893), 
which held that adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testifY violated a federal statute that 
provided that a defendant's failure to testifY "shall not create any presumption against him." /d. at 65; 
see Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613. 
72. 380 U.S. at 609. 
73. /d. at 611. 
74. /d. at 609. 
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exercising a constitutional privilege" (the right to remain silent) that 
unconstitutionally "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion 
costly."75 In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that "the 
inference of guilt for failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the 
accused's knowledge is ... natural and irresistible,"76 but it explained: 
"What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. 
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused 
into evidence against him is quite another."77 
As a result of Griffin, a prosecutor may no longer argue and a trial 
court may not instruct that the defendant's refusal to testify supports any 
inference of guilt, even in those circumstances where a logical inference 
to that effect is "natural and irresistible" as it was in Griffin itself. By 
precluding such argument and judicial comment on the grounds that it 
makes assertion of the privilege "costly," the Supreme Court, by design, 
rendered a defendant's silence less "costly," significantly shifting the 
overall calculus regarding the decision to testify in favor of remaining 
silent.78 
D. A Prosecutor May Comment on a TestifYing Defendant's 
"Opportunity" to Tailor Testimony 
In contrast to the curtailment of prosecutorial comment on the 
defendant's failure to testify, the Supreme Court has heartily endorsed 
adverse prosecutorial comment on a defendant's testimony. A 
prosecutor has, of course, always been free to highlight the defendant's 
compelling motive to lie based on an abiding interest in acquittal over 
conviction.79 Prosecutors are authorized by the Court's ruling in 
75. /d. at 614-15. 
76. !d. Indeed, in a later case that upheld consideration of a prisoner's silence in the face of 
accusation as evidence of guilt in prison disciplinary hearings, the Court emphasized that "'[s]ilence is 
often evidence of the most persuasive character."' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) 
(quoting United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923)). The Court also 
acknowledged in that case that adverse inferences from silence are permitted in civil cases, and 
attempted to explain the contrary rule in criminal cases on the ground that "[i]n criminal cases, ... the 
stakes are higher and the State's sole interest is to convict." !d. at 318-19. 
77. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
78. /d. Lerner, supra note 4, at 824 (highlighting Griffin decision in arguing that "Supreme 
Court interpretations of our Fifth Amendment help to shield a defendant from the normal consequences 
of not testifying"). The California Supreme Court had earlier recognized that allowing prosecutorial and 
judicial comment on the refusal to take the stand "might encourage some defendants to testify to avoid 
the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from their failure to do so" but concluded that "this 
encouragement does not amount to the compulsion to testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment." 
People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753,763 (Cal. 1965). 
79. See Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,304 (1895) (recognizing that a defendant's "deep 
personal interest ... in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in weighing his evidence"). 
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Portuondo v. Agard to also argue opportunity: that "a defendant's 
presence in the courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor 
his testimony" to that of the other witnesses. 80 Specifically, the 
prosecutor in Portuondo argued in summation: 
You know, ladies and gentlemen, unlike all the other witnesses in 
this case the defendant has a benefit and the benefit that he has, unlike all 
the other witnesses, is he gets to sit here and listen to the testimony of all 
the other witnesses before he testifies .... 81 
The prosecutor added that this opportunity gives the defendant "a big 
advantage," to "sit here and think what am I going to say and how am I 
going to say it? How am I going to fit it into the evidence?"82 
In approving this line of argument, the Court was not troubled that it 
burdened the defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him" and to consult with counsel during trial, 83 
and, as noted by the dissent, thus "transforrn[ed] a defendant's presence 
at trial from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on his 
credibility."84 The majority argued instead that the prosecutor's 
argument was "in accord with our longstanding rule that when a 
defendant takes the stand, 'his credibility may be impeached and his 
testimony assailed like that of any other witness."'85 The majority saw 
"no reason to depart from the practice of treating testifying defendants 
the same as other witnesses" especially as the prosecutor's comments 
forwarded "the central function of the trial, which is to discover the 
truth."86 
By once again emphasizing the overriding importance to the search 
for truth of impeaching the defendant's testimony, the Court in 
Portuondo further decreased the value to a defendant of testifying, and 
made silence more appealing by comparison. 
80. 529 u.s. 61, 73 (2000). 
81. !d. at 64. 
82. /d. 
83. See U.S. CONST. amend .. VI; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (court order 
that "prevented petitioner from consulting his attorney during a 17-hour overnight recess, when an 
accused would normally confer with counsel" was unconstitutional). 
84. Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 76 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
85. !d. at 69 (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154 (1958)). 
86. !d. at 73. There is, of course, some cognitive dissonance in the Court's reliance on the 
principle that defendants should be treated like any other witness to endorse an argument that the 
defendant was '"unlike all the other witnesses."' /d. at 64. 
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E. Favorable Jury Instructions For Silent Defendants 
Almost twenty years after Griffin, the Court shifted the balance of 
incentives further in favor of remaining silent in resolving a question 
explicitly left open in that case: whether the federal constitution not only 
forbids adverse comment on a defendant's silence, but actually requires 
some form of favorable judicial comment. 87 In Carter v. Kentucky, the 
Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the 
Constitution required state and federal trial courts to instruct criminal 
juries that they must draw "no adverse inference" from a defendant's 
failure to testify.88 
Picking up on its recognition decades earlier that the inference of guilt 
from a defendant's failure to testify was quite "natural," the Supreme 
Court in Carter recognized that even without adverse prosecutorial or 
court comment, jurors would nonetheless interpret the defendant's 
silence as "'a clear confession of crime. "'89 The Court reasoned: "No 
judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands 
mute in the face of a criminal accusation, but a judge can, and must, if 
requested to do so, use the unique ~ower of the jury instruction to reduce 
that speculation to a minimum."9 In the Court's view, "the failure to 
87. In Griffin v. California, the Court "reserve[ d) decision on whether an accused can require" as 
a matter of constitutional law that the jury "be instructed that his silence must be disregarded." 380 U.S. 
609,615 n.6. 
88. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981) (holding that "the Fifth Amendment requires 
that a criminal trial judge must give a 'no-adverse-inference' jury instruction when requested by a 
defendant to do so"). The instruction erroneously rejected by the trial court in Carter was as follows: 
'"The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference 
of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way."' !d. at 294. 
89. !d. at 301 n.18 (recognizing that "[i]t has been almost universally thought that juries notice a 
defendant's failure to testify" and this fact is '"inescapably impressed on the jury's consciousness"' and, 
as the Court had previously acknowledged, the '"layman's natural first suggestion would probably be 
that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime"' (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 
435 U.S. 333, 340 n.IO (1978))). Carter was written by Justice Stewart, who had dissented in Griffin, 
and thus, not surprisingly, echoed one of the key concerns of the Griffin dissent. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 
621 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("How can it be said that the inferences drawn by a jury will be more 
detrimental to a defendant under the limiting and carefully controlling language of the instruction here 
involved than would result if the jury were left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts to guide 
it, to draw from the defendant's silence broad inferences of guilt?"); see Carter, 450 U.S. at 301 n.7 
(citing Griffin dissent); id. at 309 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he author of the 
present opinion dissented" in Griffin). 
90. Carter, 450 U.S. at 303. As in Griffin, the Court's ruling was presaged by an earlier case 
decided on statutory grounds, Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939). In Bruno, the Supreme 
Court rejected the contention that "it is a psychological impossibility not to have a presumption arise in 
the minds of jurors against an accused who fails to testify." !d. Instead, the Court decided: 
Certainly, despite the vast accumulation of psychological data, we have not yet attained 
that certitude about the human mind which would justify us in disregarding the will of 
Congress by a dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor 
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limit the jurors' speculation on the meaning of that silence," like the 
adverse comment prohibited in Griffin, "exact[ ed] an impermissible toll 
on the full and free exercise of the privilege" to remain silent.91 
The decision in Carter continued the Court's modem trend of steadily 
increasing the attractiveness of trial silence. While Griffin eliminated 
the "costly" price that a non-testifying defendant would have to pay by 
virtue of a court or prosecutor's adverse comment on the defendant's 
silence, Carter created an affirmative benefit for the non-testifying 
defendant, requiring the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the 
otherwise "natural" inference that silence indicates guilt.92 
F. Adverse Instructions Regarding Defendant Testimony 
In contrast to the now-mandated Carter instruction that strengthens 
the default position of the silent defendant, the standard instructions with 
respect to a defendant's testimony undercut the default position of the 
testifying defendant. These instructions, which vary by circuit, 
generally inform the jury that a defendant's testimony is to be viewed 
with suspicion because of the strong incentive to testify falsely to escape 
conviction. For example, one such instruction states that the defendant 
"has a deep personal interest in the result of this prosecution" which 
"creates, at least potentially, a motive for false testimony."93 While 
!d. 
would heed the instructions of the trial court that the failure of an accused to be a witness 
in his own cause "shall not create any presumption against him." 
91. Carter, 450 U.S. at 305. 
92. /d. at 301 n.l8; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,319 (1976) ("Silence is often evidence 
of the most persuasive character." (quoting United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, !53-
54 (1923))). 
93. United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 15-16 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving instruction and noting 
that it consists of "the standard language used by district judges for many years"); United States v. 
Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60,62 (1st Cir. 1988) (reversing for use of similar instruction that included statement 
that defendant had "a strong motive to lie," while noting approval of instruction in Gleason); Nelson v. 
United States, 415 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting challenge to instruction that defendant has a 
"very keen personal interest ... in the result of your verdict" and noting that instruction has been 
"approved numerous times"); United States v. Palmere, 578 F.2d I 05, 108 (5th Cir. 1978) (rejecting 
challenge to "an instruction in which the judge called the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant 
had an interest in the outcome of the case"); United States v. Hill, 470 F.2d 361, 363 (1972) (approving 
jury instruction that "the defendant has a vital interest in the outcome of this trial" and noting that 
instruction "has been upheld on several occasions"); United States v. Saletko, 452 F .2d 193, 198 (7th 
Cir. 1971) (noting growing displeasure with jury instruction but nevertheless declining to reverse for use 
of the instruction); cf Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 304 (1895) (approving instruction that 
defendant's "deep personal interest ... in the result of the suit should be considered by the jury in 
weighing his evidence"); Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("[W]hen the 
defendant does take the stand, the jury is charged to consider his interest in the outcome of the trial in 
assessing his credibility."). 
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 877 2007-2008
2008] ENCOURAGING DEFENDANT TESTIMONY 877 
some courts in recent years have expressed disapproval of such 
instructions on the grounds that they are unnecessary and "falsely 
undermine[] the presumption of innocence," it is by no means clear that 
they have fallen out of use.94 Further, even the courts that have 
disapproved such instructions support an alternative instruction that a 
proper consideration in evaluating the defendant's testimony, like that of 
any witness, is the defendant's "interest, bias, or prejudice."95 These 
instructions, combined with the fact that "[n]othing could be more 
obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's 
profound interest in the verdict," undermine the incentive to provide 
testimony by further devaluing the testimony should it be offered.96 
G. Increased Penalties For TestifYing Defendants 
In addition to the increased trial burdens placed on a testifying 
defendant in terms of additional evidence (and argument) that becomes 
available to the prosecution when the defendant takes the witness stand 
and adverse rather than favorable jury instructions, the defendant must 
also consider an additional and significant burden that attaches when the 
right to testify is exercised-the potential for an enhanced sentence upon 
conviction. 
Of course, like all witnesses a defendant who testifies falsely under 
oath is subject to a subsequent perjury prosecution.97 The practical 
94. See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing conviction 
based on "deep personal interest" instruction and recommending instructions that treat defendant's 
testimony as that of any other witness); Alexander G.P. Goldenberg, Note, Interested, but Presumed 
Innocent: Rethinking Instructions on the Credibility of TestifYing Defendants, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 745, 755-762 (2007) (describing various approaches of federal circuits to instructions regarding 
defendant testimony). 
95. /d. at 249 n.8. A related jury instruction, approved by the federal courts, instructs jurors that 
they may consider the fact that a defendant's testimony fails to explain or deny acts of an incriminating 
nature. See Sisco v. Huskey, 73 Fed.Appx. 911,913 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that instruction that jury 
may consider defendant's failure to explain acts of an incriminating nature "is fully consistent with 
established federal law"); McGahee v. Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1362 (lith Cir. 1982) ("Our precedent 
has made it clear 'that when a defendant voluntarily testifies to the merits, and not just upon a purely 
collateral matter, the prosecutor may comment upon the defendant's failure to deny or explain 
incriminating facts already in evidence."'); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917) 
(approving jury instruction that allows jury to consider testifYing defendant's failure to deny or explain 
acts of an incriminating nature). 
96. !d. at 248. 
97. Under federal law, the crime of perjury occurs when "[a] witness testifYing under oath or 
affirmation ... gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false 
testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory." United States v. Dunnigan, 
507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980) (noting that a defendant 
"would unquestionably be subject to a perjury prosecution if he knowingly lies on cross-examination"). 
All witnesses in federal court must testify under oath or affirmation. FED. R. EVID. 603 ("Before 
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barriers to such a prosecution in the form of a necessary expenditure of 
prosecution resources in a separate trial for an offense generally viewed 
as difficult to prove, make this an unlikely occurrence for any trial 
witness, including the defendant.98 Unlike any other witness, however, a 
defendant who is perceived to have testified falsely is amenable to a 
more realistic and immediate punishment. Under the federal sentencing 
guidelines, a defendant's false testimony at trial constitutes a basis for a 
recommended two-level sentencing enhancement for obstructing justice, 
a codification of a generally accepted practice of enhancing a sentence 
based on trial testimony perceived to be false. 99 The Supreme Court has 
endorsed this sentencing practice, stating, "It is rational for a sentencing 
authority to conclude that a defendant who commits a crime and then 
perjures herself in an unlawful attempt to avoid responsibility is more 
threatening to society and less deserving of leniency" as compared "with 
the defendant charged with the same crime who allows judicial 
proceedings to progress without resorting to perjury."100 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the contention that 
punishing the accused for contesting guilt impermissibly burdens the 
testif'ying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testif'y truthfully, by oath or 
affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the 
witness' mind with the duty to do so."); Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97 ("The requirement of sworn 
testimony, backed by punishment for peljury, is as much a protection for the accused as it is a threat. 
All testimony, from third-party witnesses and the accused, has greater value because of the witness' oath 
and the obligations or penalties attendant to it."). 
98. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1243 (2004) 
(reporting that only 0.2 % of convictions in federal system and in California courts are for peljury); 
Robert G. Morvillo & Christopher J. Morvillo, Untangling the Web: Defending a Perjury Case, 
LITIGATION, Winter 2007, at 8, 8 (noting that in 2003, almost twice as many defendants were prosecuted 
in district court for violations of migratory bird laws (167) than for peljury (88)); Stuart P. Green, 
Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRJM. L. REv. 9, 42 (2005) ("Most commentators agree that 
peljury and obstruction of justice occur quite commonly in our criminal justice system, though 
prosecutions for such offenses are comparatively rare."); Kevin C. McMunigal & Calvin William 
Sharpe, Reforming Extrinsic Impeachment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 363, 379 (2001) ("[L]awyer and witness 
may nonetheless be deterred from attempting ... peljury by the possibility of a separate criminal 
prosecution for peljury, though such prosecutions are rare."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2668 
(recognizing "de facto exemption" from peljury laws usually applied to criminal defendants); Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1489 (1997) ("peljury 
is notoriously difficult to prove" and "the ethos of today is that peljury is commonplace-almost 
expected and tolerated, it seems-from criminal defendants"). 
99. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3CI.I (2007) ("Obstructing or Impeding the 
Administration of Justice"); Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 98 ("Upon a proper determination that the accused 
has committed peljury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing Guidelines. 
That requirement is consistent with our precedents and is not in contravention of the privilege of an 
accused to testif'y in her own behalf."); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-46 (2005) (rendering 
sentencing guidelines "effectively advisory"). Prior to the enactment of the sentencing guidelines, the 
Supreme Court had held that a trial court could permissibly enhance a sentence based on its own finding 
that the defendant testified falsely at trial. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 ( 1978). 
I 00. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97-98; see also Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54. 
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right to testify. Instead, the Court asserts "[a]wareness" of the potential 
for an enhanced sentence based on perceived false testimony 
"realistically cannot be deemed to affect the decision of an accused but 
unconvicted defendant to testify truthfully in his own behalf."101 With 
respect to the federal sentencing guideline enhancement, the Court has 
also specifically (if somewhat facilely) explained that a defendant 
"cannot contend that increasing her sentence because of her perjury 
interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a number of 
occasions that a defendant's right to testify does not include a right to 
commit perjury."102 
The Fourth Circuit decision that was reversed by the Supreme Court 
in reaching the above conclusion provides a counterpoint to the Court's 
reasoning. In a lengthy exposition that candidly recognized the "human 
infirmities" that can subvert the criminal trial process, the Fourth Circuit 
ruled that the enhancement for testimony perceived to be false 
constituted "an intolerable burden upon the defendant's right to testify in 
his own behalf."103 The court stated that in light of the government's 
contention that "every defendant who takes the stand and is convicted 
should be given the obstruction of justice enhancement," the 
"enhancement will become the commonplace punishment for a 
convicted defendant who has had the audacity to deny the charges 
against him." The court added, "It disturbs us that testimony by an 
accused in his own defense, so basic to justice, is deemed to 'obstruct' 
justice unless the accused convinces the jury."104 
Whether or not one accepts the Supreme Court's response to the 
Fourth Circuit's analysis, the fact remains that it cannot be lost on 
defendants-even innocent ones-that if they sit silently through the 
presentation of evidence, relying on counsel to speak for them, they are 
amenable to no increased penalty. In effect, trial silence, if contrasted 
with an unsuccessful effort at claiming innocence through testimony, 
can be predicted to result in an effective two-level decrease under the 
101. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55. 
102. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96. The Supreme Court's arguments were anticipated in the Fourth 
Circuit, where that court decried "[t]he facile logic of hindsight" that "deems such disbelieved testimony 
a lie" and proposes that "inasmuch as there is no right to lie, there is no harm in sanctioning it." United 
States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 507 U.S. 87 (1993). 
103. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 185. 
104. /d. at 183; Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (stating that a 
determination of whether a defendant testified falsely constituted "an unpromising test of his prospects 
for rehabilitation if guilty" and that "[t]o allow the trial judge to impose still further punishment because 
he too disbelieves the defendant would needlessly discourage the accused from testifying in his own 
behalf') . Justice Stewart dissenting in Grayson emphasized that the Court's holding amounted to a 
conclusion that "whenever a defendant testifies in his own behalf and is found guilty, he opens himself 
to the possibility of an enhanced sentence." Grayson, 438 U.S. at 56. 
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sentencing guidelines, roughly equivalent to the sentencing advantage 
gained by pleading guilty. 105 Thus, the fact that a testifying defendant 
faces not only speculative perjury charges but also the likelihood of a 
sentencing enhancement if convicted constitutes a powerful disincentive 
to testify. As the Supreme Court has stated with ominous overtones for 
defendants deciding whether to take the witness stand, "We have 
repeatedly insisted that when defendants testify, they must testify 
truthfully or suffer the consequences."106 
IV. AN ALTERNATJVE INCENTIVE SCHEME 
Given the severe imbalance created by the numerous legal incentives 
to remain silent and disincentives to testify described in the preceding 
sections, it is not surprising that a large percentage of criminal 
defendants decline to take the witness stand. 107 What is surprising is 
that this legal framework, which is neither required by the Constitution 
nor beneficial to the workings of criminal justice, has arisen at all. 
Indeed, the only readily apparent beneficiaries of the current system are 
a small subset of guilty defendants who would have no interest in 
testifying under any legal regime and who are able to pool with an 
artificially inflated number of innocent defendants now deterred from 
testifying. 108 
105. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EI.I(a) (2007) ("Acceptance of 
Responsibility"); see Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 184 n.5 (recognizing the strength of the enhancement for 
false testimony, increasing the guidelines range in that case "from 41-51 to 51-63 months" and "[a]t the 
highest offense levels, the increase is more drastic, from 292-365 months to 360-life"). 
106. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980) (emphasis added). In a related vein, the 
Supreme Court has also held that "the right to counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will 
cooperate with planned perjury" and, in fact , "A lawyer who would so cooperate would be at risk of 
prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings, including suspension or disbarment." 
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986); Grayson , 438 U.S. at 54 ("Counsel ethically cannot assist 
his client in presenting what the anorney has reason to believe is false testimony."). Thus, defense 
counsel too is faced with potential adverse consequences should the defendant testify. These 
consequences are, of course, wiped away if the defendant instead exercises his right to remain silent. 
Granting defense counsel an independent incentive to silence one's client is particularly significant 
given that counsel is the primary mechanism for informing the defendant of the advantages and 
disadvantages of testifying. Natapoff, supra note I, at 1469-70 (contending that defense counsel are the 
"most immediate engine of a defendant's silence" and often operate as "professional silencers"); Lerner, 
supra note 4, at 827 (reporting that in French system, the defendant is not placed under oath at trial and 
"(i]t is permissible to advise the defendant to lie, and in fact defense lawyers in France sometimes 
recommend it on certain points"). 
107. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 403, 482 (1992) (recognizing that American criminal procedural rules "often operate to 
strongly discourage the defendant from taking the stand"); see also sources cited supra note I. 
I 08. It has been argued that the Griffin jurisprudence actually helps juries "to distinguish the 
guilty from the innocent by inducing an anti-pooling effect that enhances the credibility of innocent 
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To the extent defendants are deterred from taking the witness stand by 
the patchwork of rules described in the preceding section, both the 
defendants and the criminal justice system suffer. Defendants suffer by 
being forced to relinquish their right to speak on their own behalf. The 
justice system suffers because it is deprived of the information 
defendants would provide, either willingly through truthful testimony or 
unwittingly through false testimony. To the extent prosecutors have an 
interest that is distinct from that of the criminal justice system generally, 
they too suffer because they are deprived of the chance to cross-examine 
the defendant, an event that from an able prosecutor's perspective 
should serve to help demonstrate guilt by revealing a guilty defendant's 
lies. 
In sum, there is little reason to adhere to the numerous aspects of the 
current criminal trial system that not only permit but encourage an 
incomplete presentation of facts to the jury. This is especially so 
because this system is compelled neither by constitutional law nor 
historical precedent, but would in fact be completely unrecognizable to 
the drafters of the Constitution. 
In light of the foregoing, this Article next presents two alternative 
reforms to the status quo that would encourage more defendants to 
testify by eliminating or at least limiting the artificial inducements to 
remaining silent at trial. First, the Article suggests the more obvious 
solution-reforming the current system by simply eliminating the legal 
rules that reward defendants for remaining silent and punish them for 
testifying. As these legal rules serve little purpose other than to 
discourage testimony, the reform could be accomplished without any 
significant collateral consequences. Second, the Article proposes a more 
incremental solution that (if embraced by district courts) would 
accomplish much of the intended result: a formal in limine procedure 
suspects" because "the right to silence affords a guilty suspect an attractive alternative to imitating an 
innocent suspect through lies." Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the 
Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L . REV. 430, 433 
(2000). This analysis, which narrowly focuses on the right to remain silent, is incomplete. A broader 
perspective that examines both the advantages of remaining silent and disadvantages of testifying, 
reveals that trial silence has been made artificially attractive to both the guilty and innocent. Further, the 
resulting pooling in silence is significantly more damaging to the reliability of trial outcomes because 
there are no mechanisms to distinguish innocent silence from guilty silence; silence is silence. When 
guilty and innocent defendants pool by testifying, however, they can be readily distinguished through 
the tools of the adversary process, e.g., cross-examination, rebuttal witnesses, etc. Cf Van Kessel, supra 
note I, at 986-87 (criticizing Seidmann & Stein, supra, because "in the real word of the American 
criminal process, only a very few innocents likely benefit from the general 'anti-pooling' effect of the 
guilty who exercise their right to silence"); Friedman, supra note 10, at 673 (criticizing argument that 
allowing character impeachment helps to sort out innocent from guilty defendants because "[i]t is by no 
means clear that a guilty defendant subject to character impeachment is at all more likely than an 
innocent one to stay ofT the stand because of the rule" permitting impeachment). 
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whereby a criminal defendant could involve the trial court in structuring 
an alternative set of legal rules designed to elicit the defendant's 
testimony in a particular case. Each of these proposals is intended to 
accomplish the goal of increasing the percentage of defendants who 
testify without significantly altering the existing balance of power 
between defendants and the prosecution. 
A. Reform Alternative No. 1: Alter the Existing Framework 
The most direct means of altering the status quo to encourage a 
greater percentage of criminal defendants to testify is to simply 
eliminate the pronounced bias in favor of trial silence that exists under 
the current criminal trial framework. By decreasing the benefits that 
accrue to silent defendants and eliminating the penalties that apply when 
defendants testify, such a change could, in fact, reverse the existing 
imbalance and induce a far greater percentage of defendants to testify. 
This reform could be implemented with minimal disruption to the 
overall functioning of the criminal justice system as there is a great deal 
of low hanging fruit, i.e., legal rules that penalize testimony or reward 
silence, or both, but that serve little other purpose. With one possible 
exception (noted below), this proposal could be implemented by 
enacting a new Federal Rule of Evidence consisting of the following 
five subrules that would, in concert, reverse the existing anti-testimonial 
bias of the rules governing criminal trials. 109 
Subrule 1: Restrict impeachment of a criminal defendant's testimony 
with evidence not admissible in the prosecution's case in chief. 
This first subrule would eliminate the primary tactical advantage that 
accompanies trial silence by making the evidence that will be admissible 
at trial substantially the same whether or not the defendant testifies. 
This could be accomplished in either of two ways: (i) permitting the use 
of traditional impeachment-only evidence (illegally obtained evidence, 
prior convictions, etc.) as substantive evidence in the prosecution's case 
in chief; or (ii) prohibiting the use of such evidence altogether. Given 
109. A federal rule would, of course, apply solely to federal criminal trials, but could nonetheless 
be expected to serve as a model for state jurisdictions. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving 
Criminal Jury Decision Making after the Blakely Revolution, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 301, 313 (2006) 
(recognizing that "the Federal Rules of Evidence ... have been the model for many states' rules of 
evidence"); Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 V AND. L. REv. 65, 121 (2008) (acknowledging 
that "[t]he Federal Rules of Evidence . . . function ... as a model that advises state courts and 
legislators"). 
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the numerous constitutional obstacles to the fonner course, 110 the latter 
seems preferable. 
Under the latter course, the prosecution would no longer be able to 
impeach a defendant's credibility with prior convictions, eliminating the 
strongest disincentive to defendant testimony. The prosecution would 
also be generally precluded from using illegally obtained evidence and 
items such as a defendant's suppression hearing testimony for 
impeachment. 
The prosecution would still be pennitted, however, to impeach the 
defendant with prior convictions, illegally obtained evidence, or 
analogous evidence in one narrow circumstance: if that evidence directly 
contradicts a statement made by the defendant on the witness stand. For 
example, if the defendant claims to have never been convicted of a 
crime, the prosecution should be able to impeach that testimony with a 
prior conviction; or if the defendant claims not to have been carrying 
drugs when arrested, the prosecution could impeach that testimony with 
drugs loca.ted in an unlawful search. 111 Apart from this narrow 
circumstance, however, such evidence would remain inadmissible even 
if it would serve to indirectly undennine a defendant's direct 
examination testimony or impeach the defendant's general credibility as 
a witness. 112 
In fact, the Supreme Court had at one point similarly suggested that 
II 0. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining potential that prior conviction 
propensity evidence could violate due process or fair trial rights) as well as cases such as Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 657 (1961), that compel exclusion 
of unlawfully obtained evidence in the prosecution's case in chief. See also Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (mandating exclusion of defendant's suppression hearing testimony as 
evidence in prosecution's case in chief at trial). 
Ill . Under this subrule, the defendant could comfortably testify to his innocence of the charged 
offense without opening the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence by avoiding such statements on 
direct examination. The prosecutor would then be unable under existing case law to subsequently 
anempt on cross-examination to "open the door" to the inadmissible evidence by eliciting a directly 
contradictory statement. See United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that "'impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permined where employed as a mere 
subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible"' and noting that this rule "has been 
accepted in all circuits that have considered the issue" (quoting United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 
190 (4th Cir. 1975))); United States v. Peterman, 841 F.2d 1474, 1479 (lOth Cir. 1988) (stating that 
"impeachment" is not permined where it is employed "'as a guise for submining to the jury substantive 
evidence that is otherwise unavailable"' (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 737 F.2d 864, 868 (lOth 
Cir. 1984))); United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1995) ("'[T]he government must not 
knowingly elicit testimony from a witness in order to impeach him with otherwise inadmissible 
testimony."' (quoting United States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553,555 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
112. The provision (subrule I) would preclude the presentation of evidence such as that described 
in subparts lll.A&B, supra, but would not otherwise alter the prosecution's ability to sponsor rebunal 
evidence intended to undermine the defendant's factual testimony, such as a witness who could debunk 
a defendant's alibi. 
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impeachment, at least with respect to illegally obtained evidence, should 
be limited to circumstances where the evidence impeaches a directly 
contradictory statement uttered by the defendant on direct examination. 
The Court justified this limitation on the ground that a defendant "must 
be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby 
giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence 
illegall~ secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in 
chief." 13 In Agnello v. United States, 114 the Court applied this principle, 
holding that a defendant's testimony that he received packages of drugs 
without knowing their contents and had never "seen narcotics" could not 
be impeached with an illegally seized can of cocaine found in his 
bedroom. 115 The reform proposed here picks up this later discarded 
strand of Supreme Court case law, allowing defendants the freedom to 
testify without thereby granting the prosecution license to introduce all 
manner of otherwise inadmissible evidence on the heels of that 
testimony. 
While appearing somewhat favorable to the defense, this subrule 
would do little to alter the jury's overall perception of a defendant's 
testimony-the ostensible purpose of the foregone impeachment. This 
is because impeachment of a testifying defendant with extrinsic 
113. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (in prosecution for sale of narcotics, where 
"defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made 
the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics," his testimony could be 
impeached with illegally obtained evidence of heroin taken from his home and in his presence). 
114. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Agnello was severely limited in later cases. See United States v. 
Havens, 446 U.S. 620,624 (1980); infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
115. 269 U.S. at 29-30; Walder, 347 U.S. at 66 (recognizing that Agnello "foreshadowed, perhaps 
unwittingly, the result we reach today") . The Court later rejected this path, however, retreating from any 
suggestion that impeachment of a defendant was limited except by the general rules governing the 
proper scope of cross-examination. The now-extant rule merely restates the constraint generally 
applicable to all cross-examination-inquiry is "limited to the subject matter of the direct examination 
and matters affecting the credibility of the witness." FED. R. Evm. 6ll(b). See Havens, 446 U.S. at 627 
(stating that use of illegally seized evidence for impeachment is permitted whenever an inquiry 
supported by that evidence is "plainly within the scope of the defendant's direct examination"); James v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1990) ("[l)n United States v. Havens, . . . the Court expanded the 
exception to permit prosecutors to introduce illegally obtained evidence in order to impeach a 
defendant 's 'answers to questions put to him on cross-examination that are plainly within the scope of 
the defendant's direct examination."' (quoting Havens,. 446 U.S. at 627)); United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 910 (1984) ("[E)vidence inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief or otherwise as 
substantive evidence of guilt may be used to impeach statements made by a defendant in response to 
'proper cross-examination reasonably suggested by the defendant's direct examination."' (quoting 
Havens, 446 U.S. at 627-28)). This limitation, in fact, attains a constitutional dimension in this context 
as courts have recognized the scope of the defendant ' s Fifth Amendment waiver in taking the witness 
stand to be "coextensive with the scope of relevant cross-examination." Brown v. United States, 356 
U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (ruling that when a defendant takes the stand, "the breadth of [a defendant's 
Fifth Amendment] waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination"); United States v. 
Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). 
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evidence as would be excluded by this proposal is singularly 
unnecessary. Unlike any other witness, "[a] testifying defendant's 
credibility is impeached by his interest in the trial's outcome even before 
he utters a word." 116 Not only is every defendant subject to this form of 
impeachment, but the impeachment is quite powerful. Juries, who 
generally have little sympathy for persons charged with crime, are well 
aware that defendants have a strong incentive to shade their testimony to 
favor acquittal. Consequently, the need for additional credibility 
impeachment of any particular defendant's testimony is generally 
minimal. 117 
Further, to the extent that impeachment evidence excluded under this 
proposal would influence a jury's verdict, the influence likely would be 
legally improper-e.g., an inference of guilt as opposed to an inference 
of non-credibility based on prior criminal conduct or illegally obtained 
evidence. 118 The elimination of the potential for juries to use 
116. Kainen, supra note 59, at 1313; United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238,248 (2d Cir. 2006) 
("Nothing could be more obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's profound 
interest in the verdict."); Hornstein, supra note 46, at 62 ("[W]hatever probative value prior conviction 
evidence may have on the believability of a defendant's testimony, it is likely to pale in the face of the 
defendant's obvious interest in the outcome of the case, an interest that will cause the jury to be cautious 
in its assessment of the defendant's testimony."); Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned If 
They Do, Damned If They Don't: Jurors' Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital 
Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 60, 66 (2005) (reporting results of juror interviews that showed that jurors 
generally view defendant testimony as not trustworthy); Dodson, supra note 46, at 49-50 ('"[T]he 
defendant's credibility is already so much lower than that of the other witnesses (because it obviously is 
in the defendant's self-interest to give testimony which favors his or her position) that the admission of 
prior convictions does not reduce the credibility of the defendant further."' (quoting Roselle L. Wissler 
& Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions When Jurors Use Prior Conviction 
Evidence to Decide Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37,47 (1985))); cf Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 
242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("One need not look for prior convictions to find motivation to falsify, for 
certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant has a prior record. What greater 
incentive is there than the avoidance of conviction? We can expect jurors to be naturally wary of the 
defendant's testimony, even though they may be unaware of his past conduct."). 
117. As Hawaii's highest court has explained, impeachment with prior convictions is "of little real 
assistance to the jury in its determination of whether the defendant's testimony as a witness is credible" 
because "every criminal defendant may be under great pressure to lie" to avoid conviction. State v. 
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971). "Furthermore, since the jury is presumably qualified to 
determine whether or not a witness is lying from his demeanor and his reaction to probing cross-
examination, there would appear to be little need for evidence of prior convictions .... " !d.; see 28 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6134 ( 1993) 
("Conviction evidence offered against an accused often will have little probative value. This is because 
the evidence will not add much to the jurors' evaluation of credibility since it tells them nothing they do 
not already know; the defendant is an interested witness who, if guilty, probably would not hesitate to 
commit another crime like perjury to save his skin."); Friedman, supra note 10, at 659 ("[A] rational 
jury usually will conclude, even without character impeachment, that the accused has a strong interest in 
lying and little compunction against doing so" and consequently "[c]haracter impeachment evidence is 
overkill."). 
118. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The impact of criminal 
convictions will often be damaging to an accused and it is admittedly difficult to restrict its impact, by 
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impeachment evidence as improper evidence of substantive guilt IS a 
positive collateral effect of the proposal. 
Subrule 2: Provide that a defendant's sentence may not be enhanced 
based on a fmding that he testified falsely 
The second subrule would eliminate the disincentive to testifying 
created by the prospect that disbelieved testimony will be used to 
enhance the defendant's sentence upon conviction. Again, the 
prosecution would lose little by virtue of this provision. Trial courts 
have broad sentencing discretion, and are likely to impose substantially 
similar (if marginally lower) sentences, particularly in more serious 
cases, even if unable to resort to a specific enhancement for perceived 
false testimony. 119 The subrule would simply decouple the district 
court's sentencing decision from the defendant's decision to take the 
witness stand, leaving the court with numerous alternative 
considerations from which to shape an appropriate sentence. 
As this subrule does not preclude a defendant, like any other witness, 
from being prosecuted in a subsequent perjury proceeding, the proposal 
neither grants the defendant "a right to commit perjury,"120 nor does it 
require the defendant to testify without being placed under oath. 
Subrule 3: Prohibit jury instructions and prosecutorial comment that 
single out the defendant's testimony 
The third subrule would eliminate jury instructions such as those 
discussed in subpart III.E, supra, that emphasize that the defendant has a 
particularly powerful incentive to testify falsely. This is in line with the 
current trend in the case law that suggests such instructions are 
cautionary instructions, to the issue of credibility."); United States v. Garber, 471 F.2d 212,215 (5th Cir. 
1972) (recognizing criticism that prior conviction evidence "may not always reflect directly upon 
credibility, and the jury may not always have the mental discipline to consider it only for impeachment 
purposes"); Dodson, supra note 46, at 31, 42-43 (reporting results of juror studies that reveal that 
"jurors do use prior conviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and frequently ignore or fail to 
understand limiting instructions"; "the conclusion these scientists have reached simply confirms what 
lawyers, judges, and courts have known all along. Juries will use evidence of prior convictions for 
impermissible purposes and a judge's limiting instruction will have little or no effect on jurors."); 
Gainor, supra note 49, at 764 (questioning whether the typical jury is capable of making the distinction 
called upon by cautionary instructions respecting proper use of prior convictions). 
119. The sentencing judge's discretion is broader now in this respect than it was prior to United 
States v. Booker, which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory. 543 U.S. 
220, 245-46 (2005). 
120. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,96 (1993). 
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unnecessary and potentially unconstitutiona1. 121 Courts could still 
instruct jurors that they could consider any witness's bias or interest in 
evaluating the witness's testimony, as long as the defendant is not 
singled out as particularly suspect. Again, enactment of this provision is 
unlikely to produce any significant advantage for the defense in a 
criminal case as jurors are well aware of the defendant's interest in the 
outcome and need no instruction on that score. 122 Along these same 
lines, this subrule would also grohibit prosecutorial argument, such as 
that endorsed in Portuondo, 1 3 that focuses on defendants' unique 
opportunity to observe the trial testimony and tailor their testimony to 
that of the other witnesses. Such comment is again unnecessary as the 
point is patently obvious and serves primarily to overpersuade the jury 
by suggesting that defendant testimony should be summarily discarded. 
Thus, to the extent such argument has any broad effect on criminal trials, 
the effect is an undesirable one-to deter defendants from offering their 
testimony at all. 
Subrule 4: Permit circumscribed "adverse comment" on a defendant's 
refusal to take the stand 
One of the most powerful inducements to defendant silence in the 
existing criminal trial system is the trial court's affirmative obligation to 
neutralize the otherwise "natural" negative consequences of declining to 
take the witness stand. 124 This obligation is crystallized in the trial 
context in the holdings of Griffin v. California and Carter v. Kentucky, 
discussed in subparts III.C, E, supra, which prohibit adverse comment 
on the defendant's silence and require trial courts to instruct juries not to 
consider that silence for any purpose. 
A key rationale underlying the Griffin and Carter decisions is that an 
inference of guilt from silence is often unwarranted because defendants 
may decline to testify for tactical reasons having nothing to do with guilt 
or innocence. In fact, the Supreme Court in both Griffin and Carter 
specifically emphasized the possibility that an innocent defendant would 
decline to testify in order to preclude the introduction of prior 
convictions, a possibility that is eliminated by the proposed reforms. 125 
121. See cases cited supra note 93. 
122. United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Nothing could be more obvious, 
and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant's profound interest in the verdict."); see also 
sources cited supra note 116. 
123. See supra Part 111.0. 
124. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288,301 n.IS (1981). 
125. The Griffin court stated that an inference of guilt based on a defendant's failure to testify was 
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By directly undermining one of its key rationales, subrules one through 
three lay the groundwork for the Griffin and Carter regime to be 
revisited, and the pre-Griffin situation of "carefully circumscribed"126 
comment on a defendant's failure to testify reinstated in subrule four. 
Significantly, Griffin need not be overruled to achieve this outcome, but 
merely limited to the circumstances then present-where numerous 
tactical considerations unknown to juries (primarily, impeachment with 
prior convictions) invalidated any otherwise natural inference that a 
defendant's refusal to testify indicated consciousness of guilt. 
Revisiting the rule of Griffin, and its logical expansion in Carter, is also 
supported by the widespread recognition of Griffin's questionable 
historical and constitutional underpinnings. 127 
not necessarily appropriate because "'the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will prejudice 
the jury,"' and thus "another possible inference can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand."' 
Griffin, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763 (Cal. 1965)). In 
Carter, the court again highlighted the "fear of impeachment by prior convictions" among a handful of 
potential reasons unrelated to guilt that a defendant could be dissuaded from testifying. Carter, 450 U.S. 
at 300 n.l5. The Court identified such impeachment as "the petitioner's fear in the present case" and 
quoted extensively from the defense counsel's discussion with his client in the trial court, in which: 
"Counsel ... explained to the petitioner that if he testified the Commonwealth could 'use the fact that 
you have several offenses on your record ... [to] impeach your ... propensity to tell the truth .... "' and 
counsel "added that in his experience this was 'a heavy thing; it is very serious, and I think juries take it 
very seriously .... "' !d. at 293; Friedman, supra note 10, at 680 (arguing for elimination of rule 
allowing impeachment of testifying defendants with prior convictions and recognizing that "a 
consequence" of such a change may be "to cut down the main rationale underlying Griffin"). 
126. People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 761 (Cal. 1965). 
127. Griffin was criticized immediately on the ground that adverse comment on a defendant's 
silence involves no compulsion, which previous cases had held was "a necessary element of [the] 
compulsory self-incrimination" prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 
293, 304 (1966); see also Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court in this case 
stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds .... "). Griffin continues to be 
frowned upon by past and present Justices. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331-36 (1999) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas, J., O'Connor, J.) (criticizing Griffin as a 
"wrong tum" lacking constitutional or historical support); see also Friendly, supra note 33, at 700 
(1968) (arguing that Griffin "gave inadequate weight to the language of the amendment that testimony 
must be 'compelled"'); cf Michael Steven Green, The Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 133-34 (2002) 
(Fifth Amendment jurisprudence "is universally recognized to be a hopeless muddle-'an inconsistent 
combination of difficult-to-justify broad rules and a hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions"' and 
concluding that "judicial. .attempts to determine its scope in a principled fashion cannot .succeed"). 
While the case is not likely to be overruled, see Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 343 (no other Justice joined Justice 
Thomas's dissent stating that "I would be willing to reconsider Griffin and Carter in the appropriate 
case"), it is quite possible that the Justices would accept a limitation of Griffin as described above. 
Indeed, since Griffin, the Court has held that a prisoner's silence in the face of accusation can be used as 
evidence of guilt in prison disciplinary hearings on the ground that "[s]ilence is often evidence of the 
most persuasive character," Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (quoting United States ex 
ref. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923)), and in an earlier plurality opinion addressing 
solely constitutional rights contained in the Fourteenth Amendment stated that: 
It seems quite natural that when a defendant has opportunity to deny or explain facts and 
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Comment permitted under the pre-Griffin California rule was, in its 
time, sanctioned by "[t]he Model Code of Evidence, and the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence," "endorsed by resolution of the American Bar 
Association and the American Law Institute, and [had] the support of the 
weight of scholarly opinion."128 The rule permitted either comment or 
instruction only with respect to facts that were within the defendant's 
"power" to explain or deny, and did not permit the defendant's lack of 
testimony to substitute for a failure of proof of any element of the 
prosecutor's case. 129 These limits could be reinstated in the form of a 
jury instruction analogous to that employed by the California courts 
prior to Griffin. 130 Returning to a pre-Griffin world, where defendants 
could not hide behind Carter's "no adverse inference" instruction and 
were subject to circumscribed prosecutorial comment and judicial 
instruction regarding trial silence, would go a long way toward reversing 
the anti-testimonial thrust of the existing criminal trial rules by 
determines not to do so, the prosecution should bring out the strength of the evidence by 
commenting upon defendant's failure to explain or deny it. ... In that case a failure to 
explain would point to an inability to explain. 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947); see also United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 
U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923) ("Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.") As stated in 
another context, despite occasional skirmishes, "[t)here is no war between the Constitution and common 
sense." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 (1961). 
128. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 337 n.5 
( 1978) (recognizing that the practice disapproved in Griffin "at one time ... enjoyed the approval of the 
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association" and that "instructions similar to those at 
issue in Griffin had been sanctioned by the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of 
Evidence"); see also Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2667 (recognizing that English law currently 
"authoriz[es] judges and jurors to draw ... adverse inferences" from defendant silence "in many 
situations"). California's comment rule was adopted as an amendment to the California Constitution in 
1934 "following studies made by the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association" and 
reversed the then-existing rule that no such comment was allowed. People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 7 
(Cal. 1946), ajf'd, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). The amendment stated: 
No person shall . . . be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against 
himself ... but in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to 
explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be 
commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the 
jury. 
Modesto, 398 P.2d at 759 n.l. In applying the provision, the California courts limited the adverse 
comment permitted, emphasizing that the defendant's failure to testify could, at most, support an 
inference that the prosecutor's evidence on a point within the defendant's knowledge was sound, but 
could not itself substitute for a failure of proof of any element of the prosecutor's case. Adamson, 165 
P.2dat9-IO. 
129. /d. 
130. Any residual unfairness caused by altering the rule of Griffin could perhaps be mitigated by a 
procedure permitting the defense to rebut an adverse inference based on a defendant's silence by 
introducing evidence or argument regarding reasons consistent with innocence that the defendant 
declined to testify, such as extreme nervousness, difficulty with public speaking, etc. 
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resurrecting a powerful incentive to testify at trial. 131 
Subrule 5: Require trial courts to ensure that a non-testifying defendant 
has voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to testify 
Currently, the federal system has no requirement that trial courts 
insure that defendants are made aware of their right to testify. 132 By 
having the court inquire into the defendant's voluntary waiver of the 
right to testify, this subrule will guarantee that when defendants forego 
that right they do so knowingly and voluntarily. To minimize the 
number of defendants who fail to testify because of a misapprehension 
of the scope of their rights, the trial court could ensure in a short, formal 
colloquy that defendants who intend to remain silent at trial correctly 
perceive the basic legal advantages and disadvantages of testimony-
e.g., impeachment with prior convictions, Griffin and Carter 
protections-a colloquy that would be particularly important given the 
broad changes in these tactical considerations that would result if this 
Article's proposals were adopted. 
B. Reform Alternative No. 2: Bargaining Around the Default Framework 
Through In Limine Motions 
The relatively sweeping proposals summarized in the preceding 
section, while certainly the most effective method of encouraging 
defendant testimony, are not the only viable means to that end. In fact, a 
similar result could be achieved without any significant changes to 
existing criminal trial rules. Under this alternative proposal, detailed 
131. See Modesto, 398 P.2d at 763 (recognizing that pennitting comment on the defendant's 
refusal to testify "might encourage some defendants to testify to avoid the inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn from their failure to do so" but concluding that "this encouragement does not 
amount to the compulsion to testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment"). 
132. See Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2007) ("A lawyer plays the primary 
role in advising his client of the right to testify; a trial judge is not required to apprise a defendant of his 
right to testify or inquire whether he has waived it."); Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1997) 
("We agree with those courts that place no general obligation on the trial court to infonn a defendant of 
the right to testify and ascertain whether the defendant wishes to waive that right."); United States v. 
Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("[T]here is no constitutional or statutory mandate that a 
trial court inquire further into a defendant's decision not to testify .... "); Timothy P. O'Neill, 
Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right to TestifY at Criminal Trial: The Need for an On-the-
Record Waiver, 51 U. PIIT. L. REv. 809, 839 (1990) (arguing that "[i]t is imperative that American 
jurisdictions . . . institute a mechanism" requiring that defendants be infonned of their "constitutional 
right to testify"). State courts do not all follow the federal law on this point. See, e.g., LaVigne v. State, 
812 P.2d 217, 222 (Alaska 1991) ("[J]udges should make an on-the-record inquiry after the close of the 
defendant's case, although out of the jury's hearing, into whether a nontestifying defendant understands 
and voluntarily waives his right."). 
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below, a defendant who would testify but for some legal rule or rules 
rendering that decision too "costly" could file an in limine motion133 
seeking an exception to the implicated rule or rules that, if granted, 
would result in the defendant testifying. While a rudimentary form of 
such motions is already utilized to obtain a pretrial ruling on the 
admissibility of prior conviction impeachment, this proposal would 
significantly alter the existing motion practice in both substantive and 
procedural ways. 
As an initial matter, the proposed motion would be substantively 
more robust than the current species of in limine motions by virtue of an 
expanded scope. In filing the motion, the defense could seek to preclude 
any potential impeachment-only evidence, and propose alterations to the 
various other legal disincentives to testifying discussed in Part IV of this 
Article. For example, the defense could seek to exclude not only 
evidence of prior convictions, but also illegally seized evidence and a 
portion of the defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing. 
Alternatively, or additionally, the motion could condition the 
presentation of the defendant's testimony on the trial court's agreement: 
(i) not to consider the testimony for purposes of enhancing the 
defendant's ultimate sentence (if the defendant is convicted); (ii) to rely 
on a particular jury instruction regarding defendant or witness 
credibility; and (iii) to preclude certain lines of prosecutorial argument 
regarding defendant testimony. Of course, the more conditions the 
defendant placed on the provision of trial testimony, the less likely the in 
limine motion would be granted. 
To maximize the efficiency of the process envisioned here, stringent 
procedural requirements would also be required. First, the defendant 
would be required to commit to testifying ifthe motion is granted. 134 To 
133. An in limine motion is generally considered to be "any motion, whether made before or 
during trial, to exclude [or admit] anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually 
offered." Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,40 n.2 (1984). The term in limine simply means "[o]n or 
at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily." /d. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th 
ed. 1979)). 
134. There is historical precedent for such a commitment, although not in this form. Prior to the 
decision in Luce, 469 U.S. 38, where the Supreme Court held that a defendant can only appeal the 
admission of impeachment if he testifies, the federal appellate courts had permitted challenges to in 
limine rulings even when the defendant did not testify. See United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104, 
106 n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing cases). The courts differed over whether, in such circumstances, a 
defendant needed to have committed to take the stand upon a favorable ruling to preserve the challenge. 
The Ninth Circuit required the defendant "by a statement of his attorney" to "establish on the record that 
he will in fact take the stand and testify if his challenged prior convictions are excluded" and "outline 
the nature of his testimony so that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary 
balancing contemplated in Rule 609." United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (en 
bane). Other courts saw no merit in this exercise noting that "[t]he defendant incurs no risk by doing so, 
because even if the court excludes the conviction, he can later decide not to testify without penalty." 
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make this commitment meaningful, it should be accompanied by a 
prospective waiver of the defendant's rights under Griffin and Carter, a 
waiver that would take effect only if the motion is granted and the 
defendant reneges on his commitment. 135 To avoid placing defendants 
in a position of making potentially damaging commitments to testify 
without full information, the timing of the in limine motion could be 
delayed, at the defendant's election, to the conclusion of the 
prosecution's case in chief. 
Second, the trial court would be expected to evaluate only one such 
motion in any case and, absent some showing of good cause, dispose of 
subsequent motions summarily. This would encourage the defense to 
make its "best offer" in an initial motion. The trial court would not, 
however, be barred from soliciting further proposals from the defense or 
responding to a defense motion with alternative means of inducing 
testimony-in essence, "testimony bargaining." 
Under the current criminal procedure framework, the district courts 
arguably already possess the requisite authority to grant a motion made 
in accordance with the procedures described above. District courts have 
broad discretion under Rule 609 to exclude prior convictions based on 
their "prejudicial effect," and can rely on a largely forgotten, but not yet 
overruled, strain of case law in which one form of cognizable prejudice 
is that "the jury will be left without one version of the truth." 136 Courts 
United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing cases in other circuits); cf 
Luce, 469 U.S. at 42 (noting that "a defendant might make a commitment to testify if his motion is 
granted; but such a commitment is virtually risk free because of the difficulty of enforcing it"). The 
Griffin and Carter waiver proposed here definitively answers the criticism that a defendant's 
commitment to testify is a meaningless, risk-free gesture. 
i35. There is no suggestion in the case law that a defendant could not knowingly waive rights 
such as those embodied in Griffin and Carter. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) 
(holding that a no adverse inference request must be given only "upon proper request" by the defense); 
Godinez v. Moran 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.7 (1993) (recognizing that in pleading guilty, "[a] criminal 
defendant waives ... the privilege against self-incrimination"). The waiver, of course, would not bind 
the trial court, nor would it (presumably) waive objections to adverse comment not based on Griffin and 
Carter, such as that adverse comment in a particular case violated rights other rather than the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent at trial. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the trial court 
can give a Carter instruction even over the defendant's objection. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 
333,340-41 (1978) ("[T]he giving of such an instruction over the defendant's objection does not violate 
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments."). 
136. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Or put another way, the 
defendant is prejudiced by the admission of impeachment because he is consequently unable to present 
his testimony. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936,941 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1967) (requiring trial court to 
consider "whether the defendant's testimony is so important that he should not be forced to elect 
between staying silent-risking prejudice due to the jury's going without one version of the facts-and 
testifying-risking prejudice through exposure of his criminal past"). This aspect of Luck and Gordon, 
survives in modern practice in the fourth factor of the ubiquitous five factor framework that governs 
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can exclude other impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403 on the ground that the probative value of the impeachment 
is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or ... waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence."137 A court may also ground a 
ruling on its "inherent authority to manage the course of trials"138 and its 
obligation to protect both the defendant's constitutional right to testify 
and the jury's need to receive a full picture of the contested events. 139 
Finally, courts have broad discretion as to appropriate jury instructions, 
prosecutorial argument, and the factors to consider in imposing 
sentence. 140 Thus, working within the trial court's existing discretionary 
authority, the parties-or at least the defendant and the court--could 
agree on a trial framework that would permit otherwise unavailable 
evidence-the defendant's testimony-to be presented to the 
factfinder. 141 
Rule 609(a)(l) impeachment rulings in federal court. See, e.g., United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909 
(7th Cir. 2005) (recognizing "the importance of the defendant's testimony" to the jury as the fourth 
relevant factor in considering admission of prior conviction impeachment). For analysis of the 
perplexing manner in which the federal courts have distorted this factor in their recent jurisprudence, 
however, see Jeffrey Bellin, supra note 49. 
137. FED. R. Evm. 403. 
138. Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38,41 n.4 (1984) ("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence 
do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's 
inherent authority to manage the course of trials."); cf United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078 (6th 
Cir. 1993) ("Motions in limine to exclude evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion."). 
Trial courts already consider in limine motions regarding matters other than impeachment with prior 
convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990) (in limine motion 
seeking ruling regarding whether if defendant testified, "he could be required to try on or hold up the 
clothing which was found in [a] carry-on bag" that contained cocaine); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 
1110, 1115 (1st Cir. 1989) (in limine motion seeking ruling "that, if [the defendant] took the stand, 
cross-examination would be limited to the scope of his direct and questions bearing on credibility"). 
139. Cf United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) ("It is the manifest duty of the courts to 
·vindicate [constitutional] guarantees" concerning "the production of all evidence at a criminal trial" and 
"it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced."). 
140. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 (2002) (stating that district courts 
"exercise their sentencing discretion through 'an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to 
the kind of information [they] may consider, or the source from which it may come"' (quoting United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972))); United States v. Jennings, 487 F.3d 564, 580 (8th Cir. 
2007) ("The district court has wide discretion in crafting jury instructions."); United States v. Wills, 346 
F.3d 476, 491 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[T]he district court is afforded broad discretion in controlling closing 
arguments .... "). 
141. Any perceived lack of authority will be mitigated somewhat by the practical difficulty for 
both sides of appealing the court's ruling. The defendant will not be able to appeal an adverse ruling if 
he does not testify, Luce, 469 U.S. at 43, and if he does testify, it will be difficult to show that the trial 
court improperly denied the motion, since the purpose of the motion (to encourage the defendant to 
testify) was ultimately vindicated. If the motion is granted over the prosecutor's objection, it will also 
be difficult for the prosecutor to seek review. If the defendant is acquitted, the prosecutor will be barred 
from retrying the case by double jeopardy principles, and if the defendant is convicted there is no reason 
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Unfortunately, initial resistance to the proposed in limine procedure is 
to be expected. Courts and practitioners have grown increasingly 
callous to the value of hearing from defendants and are, in any event, 
loathe to experiment with procedures not explicitly recognized by 
existing rules. 142 Thus, even if district courts conclude they have the 
authority to grant such motions, they may summarily deny them. This 
could lead to sporadic and uneven application of the procedure 
throughout the federal courts. Consequently, while there may not be any 
requirement for specific authorization of the proposed in limine 
procedure, a federal rule rendering this authorization explicit would be 
advantageous. 
A rule specifically authorizing the proposed procedure would also 
provide an opportunity to make the prerequisites to a successful in 
limine motion explicit. The new rule could include the procedural 
prerequisites noted above and provide an explicit statement of the 
substantive standard to be applied, for example: the motion should be 
granted if the value of presenting the defendant's testimony to the 
factfinder outweighs the potential impairment of the adversary process 
that would result from granting the concessions requested by the 
defense. 
As the above standard suggests, in ruling on the motion the trial court 
would weigh the value to the jury of the defendant's testimony in the 
particular case against the value of the foregone impeachment and other 
interests sacrificed, if any, if the defendant's conditions are accepted. 
To permit the trial court to adequately weigh these factors, the defense 
motion should include a general proffer of the defendant's testimony and 
the court could, if necessary, hold an in camera hearing at which the 
for the prosecutor to appeal. The prosecutor can appeal certain preliminary rulings, but only before "the 
defendant has been put in jeopardy" (i.e., when the jury is empanelled and sworn). See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3731 (2000) (government can appeal "a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding 
evidence" if it does so before "the defendant has been put in jeopardy" and if the prosecutor "certifies to 
the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial 
proof of a fact material in the proceeding"); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397,399 (4th Cir. 1985). 
It is also relatively clear from existing case law that if the trial court granted a motion as 
proposed here and the defendant testifies, the court could not later renege on the promises that induced 
the testimony. Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197-99 (1943) (holding that where defendant 
was cross-examined regarding potential uncharged crime and the court informed him that he could claim 
a Fifth Amendment right not to respond, it was error to allow later prosecutorial comment on the 
invocation of the privilege). 
142. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion In Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the 
Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1280-81 (1987) (noting that in the 1960s "[c]ourts began to 
permit defense lawyers to use the motion in limine to ascertain and limit the scope of the prosecution's 
cross-examination of the accused concerning prior convictions or arrests," but that "[t]he defense bar, 
however, has had little success in persuading courts to extend the motion's applicability beyond the 
preclusion of cross examination concerning the accused's prior arrests or convictions"). 
HeinOnline  -- 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 895 2007-2008
2008] ENCOURAGING DEFENDANT TESTIMONY 895 
defendant would present key portions of that testimony. 143 The 
prosecution could respond with an opposition filing highlighting any 
particular harm to the adversary process of the particular concessions 
requested by the defendant, and perhaps suggesting a compromise 
solution. 
Trial courts will be confronted with wide variation in the "value" of 
defendant testimony to the jury in particular cases. The trial court 
should not, of course, attempt to discern the credibility of the testimony, 
which is the prerogative of the jury; 144 rather the court should evaluate 
whether the testimony provides any additional factual information that 
could inform the jury's decision. The value of a defendant's testimony 
would be highest in circumstances where that testimony would provide 
the jury with facts otherwise missing from the evidence, or if the 
defendant's testimony contradicts the facts presented by the prosecution 
witnesses. On the other hand, a defendant's testimony would hold 
relatively little value to the jurors if he intends to simply claim that he 
was not at the scene of the crime (e.g., is the victim of mistaken identity, 
or was framed by the police). In such a case, the defendant would 
essentially be offering no facts to the jury other than a claim of 
innocence which is implicit in the trial itself and can be fully presented 
by defense counsel through cross-examination of prosecution witnesses 
and the presentation of alibi witnesses. There will likely be relatively 
little variance on the other side of the balance-i.e., potential damage to 
143. A similar procedure was once authorized for the purpose of evaluating in limine motions 
regarding prior convictions, although it has since fallen into disuse. See Gordon v. United States, 383 
F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (suggesting that the trial court "have the accused take the stand in a non-
jury hearing and elicit his testimony and allow cross examination before resolving" the impeachment 
"issue"); United States v. Thomas, 452 F.2d 1373, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (describing Gordon hearing as 
one that "required putting the defendant on the stand without the jury being present, and then holding a 
hearing to elicit defendant's testimony and the proposed cross-examination prior to" the ruling on 
impeachment); People v. Delgado, 32 Cal. App. 3d 242, 253 (App. 1973), overruled by People v. Rist, 
545 P.2d 833 (Cal. 1976) ("[E]xcept, perhaps, where it is obvious what the defendant's testimony would 
be," the "defendant should testify to his version of the facts in an in camera hearing or, in the 
alternative, make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury summarizing what his testimony 
would be."). At least one court suggested such a procedure survived the enactment of Rule 609, see 
United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1977) ("Rule 609(a) ... requires the court in every 
case to weigh the probative value of admitting the evidence against its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, a process which, in many cases a judge may feel is impossible to accomplish conscientiously 
without hearing defendant's actual testimony."), a conclusion that is supported by the Supreme Court's 
ruling that a proper determination of the admissibility of impeachment under Rule 609 is not possible 
without knowing "the precise nature of the defendant's testimony." Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 . 
144. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986) ('"[Q]uestions of credibility, whether of a 
witness or of a confession, are for the jury ... . "' (quoting Jackson v. Denno 378 U.S. 368, 386 n. 13 
(1964))) . It must be remembered that even if the defendant is obviously lying, and intends to testify to a 
sequence of events contraverted by credible evidence, the presumably false testimony will still be of 
value to the jury as it demonstrates an otherwise hidden consciousness of guilt. 
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the adversary process-as the benefit to the adversary system of most of 
the impeachment that may be excluded and other concessions potentially 
granted to the defense in exchange for the defendant's testimony is 
usually small given the inherent difficulty faced by defendants in 
convincing juries to credit their testimony and the wide sentencing 
discretion enjoyed by district courts. 145 
Of course, defendants who succeed on the motion proposed here 
obtain only the opportunity to subject their testimony to the crucible of 
the adversary process, not any guarantee of success at trial. 146 A 
defendant's testimony may well be the proverbial final nail in the coffin 
that enables the jury to develop an abiding belief in the defendant's 
guilt. Consequently in many cases, prosecutors would be well advised 
not to oppose reasonable conditions requested by the defendant in return 
for testimony, and the trial court would act reasonably in accepting those 
conditions. 147 
CONCLUSION 
Demonstrating the oft-repeated maxim that "[t]here is no war between 
the Constitution and common sense,"148 this nation's founders, who 
"were not naive or disregardful of the interests of justice,"149 worked 
comfortably within a criminal justice system that took full advantage of 
the defendant as a factual resource, and where "the fundamental 
safeguard for the defendant ... was not the right to remain silent, but 
rather the opportunity to speak."150 The reforms suggested here would 
push the modern criminal trial system back toward these historical roots, 
145. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
146. The proposed in limine procedure places no added burden on defendants. Even if the motion 
is denied, the defendant is simply returned to the default framework in which testimony is permitted as 
long as the defendant accepts the corresponding burdens that attach to the exercise of the right to testify. 
147. There is, of course, one windfall beneficiary of permitting the proposed in limine motions: 
defendants who would have testified regardless of impeachment, or other potential burdens, who may 
now be able to obtain some minor concessions in return for presenting their testimony. As noted above, 
however, little is lost even in these cases because the value of foregone impeachment or any other 
concessions obtained is generally negligible. 
148. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 35 (1968) (Douglas, J. 
dissenting); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 (1974) ("Constitutional adjudication and 
common sense are not at war with each other .... "). 
149. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,427 (1956). 
150. Langbein, supra note 4, at 1047, 1049 ("Undergirding the criminal procedure of the early 
modem trial at common law was a set of rules and practices whose purpose and effect were to oblige the 
accused to respond to the charges against him."); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 2632 ("Where the Framers 
of the Constitution saw an obligation to the community to speak, later judges and scholars saw a right to 
refuse to cooperate in what they regarded as a poetic, inspiring contest between the individual and the 
state."); see also discussion supra Pan II. A; Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 66 (2000). 
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and away from a legal framework that cavalierly squanders a rich 
testimonial resource (the defendant) at great cost to the search for truth 
and with little benefit. Taking guidance from the discarded intuition of 
the early American courts-that hearing from the defendant will 
invariably illuminate, rather than darken, the path to truth-these 
reforms would reverse the thrust of the existing criminal trial rules to 
encourage rather than discourage defendant testimony. 
The reforms are not intended to, and for the most part will not, 
penalize or benefit either the prosecution or the defense. Their effect is 
narrowly focused to simply increase the factual information available to 
the jury in particular cases, a result that can be expected to improve the 
reliability of trial outcomes on the uncontroversial principle that "the 
truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the testimony of all 
persons ... who may seem to have knowledge of the facts ... leaving 
the credit and weight of such testimony to be determined by the 
jury . . .. "151 
If we believe, as we claim, that the search for truth is best served by 
subjecting all relevant testimony to "the crucible" of the adversary 
system152 and that cross-examination is the "'greatest legal engine ever 
invented for the discovery of truth,"' 153 there can be little principled 
objection to the proposed reforms, which merely encourage defendants 
to inject their testimony into the trial process by which they are to be 
judged. At the very least, appellate courts and legislators should begin 
to evaluate the effects of relaxing the penalties for defendant testimony 
by permitting district courts, in appropriate cases, to encourage 
defendants to testify by altering the default framework that all too 
frequently prevents them from doing so. 
151. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-50, 52, 54 (1987) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 22 (1967)); Amar & Lettow, supra note 3, at 922 (arguing in a related context that "one can 
simultaneously reduce both false negatives and false positives only by bringing more infonnation into a 
system" and that "[o]ur current system throws out too much information, and in the end, this hurts both 
truth-seeking prosecutors and innocent defendants"). 
152. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 (1983). 
153. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 WIGMORE§ 1367). 
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